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ARTICLES
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: FREE ACCESS
OR FREE EXERCISE?
Lucien J. Dhooge*
The L.G.B.T. movement is the main thing, the primary thing that's
going to be challenging religious liberties .... They don't have a right to
be served in every single store. People need to have the ability to refuse
service if it violates their religious convictions.I
2
This isn't 1950 Alabama; it's 2015 Indiana.
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INTRODUCTION

The past two years have been characterized by enormous strides
toward equality for the LGBT community. The U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Windsor holding that Section 3 of the Defense
of Marriage Act denying federal recognition of same-sex marriages was
a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was followed
by an almost uninterrupted string of victories on the issue of marriage
equality in federal and state courts.3 These opinions were followed by the
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges in June 2015.4 In
July 2014, President Obama issued a long-awaited executive order
protecting federal government employees from discrimination on the
basis of gender identity and prohibiting federal contractors from engaging
3. See also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (invalidating the
prohibition upon same-sex marriage in California); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir.
2014) (invalidating prohibitions upon same-sex marriage in Idaho and Nevada); Baskin v. Bogan,
766 F.3d 648, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2014) (invalidating the prohibition upon same-sex marriage in
Indiana); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (invalidating the
prohibition upon same-sex marriage in Wisconsin); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th
Cir. 2014) (invalidating the prohibition upon same-sex marriage in Oklahoma); Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating the prohibition upon same-sex marriage
in Virginia); Kitchen v. Herbert 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating the
prohibition upon same-sex marriage in Utah); Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7776, at * 12-13 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV04081-KES, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4018, at *32 (D.S.D. Jan. 12, 2015); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F.
Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Mont. 2014); Bradacs v. Haley, No. 3:13-cv-02351, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 162184, at *32-35 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2014); McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-24068, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158680, at *32 (S.D.W.V. Nov. 7, 2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-02518DDC/TJJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157093, at *57 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Guzzo v. Mead, No.
14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at *18-21 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014); Hamby v.
Parnell, No. 3:14-cv-00089-TMB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145876, at *34-35 (D. Alaska Oct. 12,
2014); General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 791
(W.D.N.C. 2014); Majors v. Jeanes, No. 2:14-cv-00518JWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127942, at
*16-17 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2014); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014);
Bums v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100894, at *5-8 (D.
Colo. July 23, 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1146 (D. Or. 2014); Whitewood
v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410,431 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862,904 (Iowa
2009); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036,1044 (N.J. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d
865, 889 (N.M. 2013).
4. No. 14-556, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4250, at *26-32, *36-42, *50 (U.S. June 26, 2015)
(holding that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry pursuant to the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and that there is no lawful basis upon which
states may deny recognition to lawful same-sex marriages performed in other states).
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in employment discrimination against members of the LGBT
community.5 These developments come on the heels of public opinion
polls evidencing shifting attitudes toward homosexuality and greater
social acceptance of the LGBT conmunity. 6

These developments have occurred at such a pace as to outstrip the
adaptation of many areas of the law to new on-the-ground realities. The
impact of judicial opinions, statutes, and administrative rules and
regulations upon areas as diverse as employment, taxation, domestic
relations, housing, and probate to name but a few remain uncertain. 7 In
5. Exec. Order No. 13,672, §§ 1-2, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014) (to be codified or
implemented at 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1, 60-2, 60-4, 60-50). See also Press Release, The White House,
Taking Action to Support LGBT Workplace Equality is Good for Business (July 21, 2014)
(contending that employers recognize that workplace equality is in their best interest and that
equality is supported by U.S. public opinion, state and local governments, and some faith
communities).
6. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, The Absolutely Stunning Rise in Supportfor Gay Marriage, in
One Chart, WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
the-fix/wp/201 5/05/20/the-absolutely-stunning-rise-in-support-for-gay-marriage-in-one-chart
(summarizing the results of Gallup's annual "Values and Beliefs Poll" in which 60% of the survey
pool supported allowing same-sex couples to marry, the highest support for same-sex marriage
Gallup has ever measured in the 19 year history of asking this question and a 23% increase from
2005); Lisa Keen, New Gallup Poll Sees Rise in Moral Acceptability of Gay and Lesbian
Relations, PRIDE SOURCE (June 5, 2014), available at http://www.pridesource.com/article.html=
66464 (summarizing the results of Gallup's annual "Values and Beliefs Poll" in which 58% of
the survey pool found gay and lesbian relations morally acceptable and 63% supported allowing
same-sex couples to adopt children); Carrie Wofford, Why Equality is Winning, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 26, 2014), available at www.usnews.com/opinions/blogs/carriewofford/2014/03/26/how-did-public-opinion-on-gay-marriage-shift-so-quickly (concluding that
"gay rights are suddenly ascendant" and attributing their rapid rise to efforts to encourage'
members of the LGBT community to self-identify and characterize same-sex marriage as
encouraging loving and committed relationships). But see Nate Cohn, Alabama, Where Same-Sex
Marriage Remains Deeply Unpopular, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/02/1 0/upshot/alabama-where-same-sex-marriage-remains-deeply-unpo
pular (summarizing a 2014 Pew Research survey in which 79% of white evangelical Christians
opposed the legalization of same-sex marriage).
7. For example, only 31 states currently prohibit discrimination in private or public
employment or both on the basis of sexual orientation with a smaller number of states extending
protection on the basis of gender identity. See IN YOUR STATE, WORKPLACE, LAMBDA LEGAL 2
(2014), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions. Although unlikely to be
widespread, efforts to repeal these prohibitions remain a possibility. See Exec. Order No. 15-01
(Kan. Feb. 10, 2015), available at http://www.govemor.ks.gov/media-room/executiveorders/2015/02/10/executive-order-no.- 15-01 (rescinding previously-issued Executive Order No.
07-24 which prohibited discrimination and harassment in public employment on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity). See also Bryan Lowry, Gov. Sam Brownback Rescinds
Protected-ClassStatusfor LGBT State Workers in Kansas, K.C. STAR (Feb. 11, 2015), available
at http://www.kansascity.con/news/govemment-politics/article9694028.htm (quoting Governor
Brownback as stating that "[t]his Executive Order ensures that state employees enjoy the same
civil rights as all Kansans without creating additional 'protected classes' as the previous order
did. Any expansion of 'protected classes' should be done by the legislature and not through
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this regard, marriage equality is but the end of the beginning. 8
The ascendancy of gay rights has been accompanied by a rise in
assertions of religious freedom. 9 These assertions have primarily taken
the form of state legislative initiatives. Supporters have cited perceived
growing threats and hostility to religious liberty as a basis for such
initiatives.10 Three examples receiving nationwide attention were
unilateral action"); Tara Siegel Bernard, What's at Stake, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2015, at B2
(discussing the implications of legalization of same-sex marriage in the areas of taxation, estate
planning, divorce, Social Security, veterans' benefits, and medical decisions).
8. See, e.g., Despite Resistance, Alabama Heads the Right Way on Same-Sex Marriage,
WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2015 ("[M]arriage equality is just one of many goals. State legislatures and
federal lawmakers need to be convinced to enhance civil rights protections for gay men and
lesbians - prohibiting employment discrimination.., or discrimination in business transactions");
Frank Bruni, Do Gays Unsettle You?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/02/08/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-same-sex-marriage-republican-scom-andunfinished-work (quoting Sarah Kate Ellis, the chief executive officer and president of GLAAD,
as stating "[wie want to make sure that marriage is looked at as the benchmark and not the finish
line"); Erik Eckholm, Next Fightfor Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2015, at Al; The Challenges that Remain After MarriageEquality, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/the-challenges-that-remain-after-marri
age-equality ("[Tlhe marriage equality victory should not be regarded as the final battle, or even
a clear sign the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Americans are on the cusp of enjoying full
equality under the law. They are not").
9. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, Religious Freedom Used to Chip Away at LGBT Rights,
MSNBC (Feb. 19, 2014), www.msnbc.com/msnbc/religious-freedom-chip-away-gay-rights
(describing gay rights from the viewpoint of social conservatives as an issue of religious freedom);
Amy Stone, The New Religious Freedom Argument, POL. RES. (Oct. 30, 2012),
www.politicalresearch.org/2012/10/30/the-new-religious-freedom-argument-gay-marriage-in-th
e-2012-election (describing same-sex marriage as the "weapon that will be and is being used to
marginalize and repress Christianity and the church" and utilization of religious freedom
arguments as a means by which to appeal to evangelical Christians, libertarians, and moderates);
Kristina Torres, Clergy Clash on 'Religious Liberty' Efforts at Capitol,ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan.
29, 2015, at B I (quoting J. Robert White, the executive director of the Georgia Baptist Convention
as stating "[i]f there has been discrimination in this country, quite honestly, it has been against
people of Christian faith, and it must stop"). But see Cathy Lynn Grossman, Survey: Americans
Turn Sharply Favorable on Gay Issues, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/nationa/religion/survey-americans-tum-sharply-favorable-ongay-issues/2014/02/26 (citing a survey conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute which
found that nearly one in four people who left their childhood religion were motivated to do so by
their former churches' negative teachings or treatment of the LGBT community).
10. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Erik Eckholm, IndianaLaw Denouncedas Invitation to
Discriminate Against Gays, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2015), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/us/politics/indiana-law-denounced-as-invitation-to-discrim
inate (quoting Indiana Governor Mike Pence as stating that "many feel their religious liberty is
under attack by government action"); Juliet Eilperin, After Veto in Arizona, Conservatives Vow to
Fight for Religious Liberties, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/after-veto-in-arizona-conservatives-vow-to-fight
(in
which a commentator expressed concern about "a public that is hostile to the very idea of religious
liberty"); Religious Freedom Bill Riles Gay Rights Supporters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 21, 2014
(in which Josh Kredit, legal counsel for the Center for Arizona Policy, stated that there is "a
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Arizona Senate Bill 1062, which was vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer in
February 2014,11 Indiana Senate Bill 101, signed into law in March
2015,12 and Arkansas Senate Bill 975 signed into law in April 2015.'3
Similar legislation was introduced in numerous other statehouses. 14 The
growing hostility toward religion"). But see In Indiana, Using Religion as a Coverfor Bigotry,
N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 31, 2015, at A24 (stating that "[tihe freedom to exercise one's religion is not
under assault in Indiana, or anywhere else in the country. Religious people - including Christians,
who continue to make up the majority of Americans - may worship however they wish and say
whatever they like" and further contending that the underlying purpose of the Indiana religious
liberty bill was bigotry).
11. See S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 1(5), 2(A-D) (Ariz. 2014) (prohibiting state
action substantially burdening the exercise of religion by any individual, business association,
trust, foundation, church or religious organization in the absence of a compelling governmental
interest advanced by the least restrictive means even if the burden arose from facially neutral laws,
laws of general applicability and in judicial and administrative proceedings regardless of whether
the government was a party). See also Fernanda Santos, Arizona Vetoes Right to Refuse Service
to Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at Al.
12. See S.B. 101, 119th Gen Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. §§ 8-9 (Ind. 2015), as amended by
S.B. 50, 119th Gen Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. § I (prohibiting state action substantially burdening
the exercise of religion by any individual, organization, or business association in the absence of
a compelling governmental interest advanced by the least restrictive means even if the burden
arises from facially neutral laws, laws of general applicability and in judicial and administrative
proceedings regardless of whether the government is a party but further providing that the bill
does not authorize denial of access to public accommodations on the basis of race, color, religion,
ancestry, age, national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or U.S. military
service).
13. See S.B. 975, 90th Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. § I (Ark. 2015) (prohibiting state action
substantially burdening the exercise of religion by any person in the absence of a compelling
governmental interest advanced by the least restrictive means even if the burden arises from a law
of general applicability).
14. See, e.g., H.B. 757, 154th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-2 (Ga. 2016) (prohibiting the state
government from taking adverse action against a person or faith-based organization on the basis
that such person or organization believes, speaks or acts in accordance with a sincerely-held
religious belief regarding marriage); S.B. 180, 16th Reg. Sess. §§ 1-2 (Ky. 2016) (exempting all
individuals and business associations from providing services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges related to the celebration of any civil union, domestic partnership
or marriage if so doing would violate sincerely-held religious beliefs); H.B. 1523, 2016 Reg. Sess.
§§ 3, 7 (Miss. 2016) (exempting all individuals and business associations from providing services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related to the celebration of any civil
union, domestic partnership or marriage if so doing would violate sincerely-held religious beliefs
and prohibiting the state government from taking adverse action against a person or faith-based
organization on the basis that such person or organization believes, speaks or acts in accordance
with a sincerely-held religious belief regarding marriage); S.J.R. 39, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. § I
(Mo. 2016) (proposing an amendment to the state constitution exempting all individuals and
business associations from providing services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges related to the celebration of any civil union, domestic partnership or marriage if so
doing would violate sincerely-held religious beliefs); H.J.R. 55, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex.
2015) (proposing an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting the state government from
substantially burdening the free exercise rights of any person in the absence of a compelling
governmental interest advanced by the least restrictive means); H.B. 4012, 82d Leg. Sess. Reg.
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introduction of such measures represented a revival of state legislative
15
efforts which had been relatively moribund since the late 1990s.
Although most of these efforts failed, twenty-one states currently have
express constitutional or legislative provisions purporting to protect the
free exercise of religion.' 6 These efforts may17 proliferate in future
legislative sessions in many parts of the country.
One of the sources of perceived threats to religious freedom are public
accommodation statutes. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
prohibit businesses deemed to be public accommodations from refusing

Sess. § 4 (W.Va. 2016) (prohibiting the state government from substantially burdening the free
exercise rights of any person in the absence of a compelling governmental interest advanced by
the least restrictive means even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability); H.B. 83,
63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. § I (Wyo. 2015) (prohibiting the state government from substantially
burdening the free exercise rights of any person in the absence of a compelling governmental
interest advanced by the least restrictive means even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability). See also Fausset & Blinder, supra note I (detailing efforts to enact religious liberty
legislation in Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
15. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 475 (2010) (noting that ten states adopted religious freedom restoration acts
between 1998 and 2000 but only three had done so in the following ten years). See also Bruce
Ledewitz, Experimenting with Religious Liberty: The Quasi-ConstitutionalStatus of Religious
Exemptions, 6 ELON L. REV. 37, 72-73 (2014) (tracing the history of state RFRAs from the
adoption of the first such statute by Connecticut in 1993).
16. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to 41-1493.02 (2015 (West) (adopted 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT.

§

52-571b(a-f) (2015) (adopted 1993); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-.05 (2015)

(adopted 1998); IDAHO CODE ANN.

§§ 73401-73-404 (West 2015) (adopted 2000); 775 ILL.

COMP. Stat. 35/1-99 (2015) (adopted 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§

60-5301 to 60-5307 (2015)

(adopted 2013); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2015) (adopted 2013); MiSS. CODE ANN. §
11-61-1 (West 2015) (adopted 2014); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302.1 (2015) (adopted 2004); N.M.
STAT. §§ 28-22-2 to 28-22-5 (2015) (adopted 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251-58 (2015) (adopted
2000); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2401-2408 (2015) (adopted 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to
42-80.1-4 (2015) (adopted 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60 (2015) (adopted 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (2015) (adopted 2009); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
11 0.001-.012 (Vernon 2015) (adopted 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-2.02(A-F) (2015) (adopted
2007). Protection of the free exercise of religion in Alabama is set forth in the state constitution.
See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01. See also supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 100 (predicting that "the demands by religious
believers for exemptions will increase and this will lead to greater conflict with the larger
society"); Jim Galloway, Religious Liberty Fight will Live on, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 2, 2015,
at BI (contending that the debate regarding RFRAs will continue "[blecause Southern Baptists.
.. are also the heart of the evangelical Christian wing of the Republican party - especially in the
all-important South"). Such legislation may also proliferate at the federal level. See First
Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015) (prohibiting the federal
government from discriminating against any person "wholly or partially on the basis that such
person believes or act in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is
or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman, or that sexual relations are
properly reserved to such a marriage").
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to serve prospective patrons on the basis of sexual orientation.' 8 These
statutes also prohibit a wide range of associated behaviors, such as aiding
and abetting discrimination, refusing accommodation to those who
associate with members of the LGBT community, and posting notices of
the right to refuse service. Application of these statutes in two wellpublicized cases involving religious objections to providing goods and

services to same-sex couples celebrating marriages or civil unions have
been the source of considerable controversy.19
Despite the uniform outcome in these cases, public accommodation
laws are ill-prepared to address sexual orientation let alone same-sex
marriage. This is due in part to the many different forms public

accommodation

statutes

take

throughout

the

country.

Further

complicating this area is the wide variety of terminology, definitions (or
the absence thereof), coverage, and prohibited practices among these
statutes. These differences have the potential to create uncertainty,
confusion and disparate treatment with respect to access to public
accommodations for the LGBT community.
This Article examines potential issues posed by the wide variety of
state public accommodation statutes in the context of sexual orientation
and religious freedom. The Article first classifies state public
accommodation laws into six separate categories with specific emphasis
upon their commonalities and differences. The Article proposes greater
uniformity among state public accommodation laws with respect to
definitions and exemptions granted either by statute or through the
enactment of religious freedom legislation.
18. See CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 51-51.5 (2015) (adopted 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601
(2015) (adopted 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-81 d, 46a-811 (2015) (adopted 1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501-04(2015) (adopted 2009); D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.01-.02,2-1402.01,2-1402.31
(2015) (adopted 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489-2-5 (2015) (adopted 2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/1-102-03, 5/5-101-03, 5/8A-104 (2015) (adopted 2006); IOWA CODE § 216.7 (2015) (adopted
2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4591-92(1) (2015) (adopted 2005); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T §§ 20-101,20-301-04 (West 2015) (adopted 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98
(2015) (adopted 1989); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.02-.03, 363A. 11, 363A.24 (2015) (adopted 1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 233.010,651.050-.070 (2015) (adopted 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354A:16-17 (2015) (adopted 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-3-5 (2015) (adopted 1992); N.M. STAT.
§§ 28-1-2, 7-9 (2015) (adopted 2004); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-96 (2015) (adopted 2002); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 659A.003-.006, 659A.406-09, 659A.885 (2015) (adopted 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-24-2-2.1 (2015) (adopted 1995); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 9, § 4502 (2015) (adopted 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 49.60.030,49.60.215 (2015) (adopted 2006); WIS. STAT. §§ 106.52 (2015) (adopted
2009).
19. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62-68 (N.M. 2013) (holding
that the refusal of a wedding photography business to photograph a same-sex commitment
ceremony violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act). See also Final Agency Order, Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at 1-2 (Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm'n May 30, 2014)
(upholding an administrative law judge's determination that the refusal by a bakery to prepare a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated Colorado's public accommodation statute).
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I. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY:

A TANGLE OF LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

A. Introduction
State public accommodation laws may be placed in one of six
categories. Category One statutes are those prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in states which also provide legislative
recognition of same-sex marriage and accompanying exemptions for
religious organizations and clergy.20 Category Two statutes are those
containing exemptions for religious organizations and individuals within
the body of existing public accommodations laws or by applicable case
law.2 1 Category Three statutes are those containing exemptions for
religious organizations and individuals through Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRA). 22 Category Four statutes are those containing
exemptions for religious organizations and clergy and a RFRA
Category Five statutes are those that do not contain explicit religious
exemptions and that do not have an accompanying RFRA. 24 Finally,
Category Six laws encompass those states lacking public
accommodations statutes. 25 The following section of the article compares
and contrasts laws within each of these six categories.
B. Category One Statutes
Category One statutes are currently in force in nine states, specifically,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
York, Vermont, and Washington, as well as the District of Columbia.
These statutes share three common features. First, each of these
jurisdictions recognize same-sex marriages through legislation. 26 The
20. See infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 62-95 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 96-138 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(a) (2015) (providing for equal treatment pursuant to
all sources of law to "same-gender and different-gender married couples and their children"); D.C.
CODE §§ 46-401(a), 46-405.01 (2015) (defining marriage as "the legally recognized union of 2
persons" and extending recognition to same-sex marriages legally performed in other
jurisdictions); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1, 572-3 (2015) (permitting marriage "between two
individuals without regard to gender" and extending recognition to same-sex marriages legally
performed in other jurisdictions); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 650-A, 650-B (2015)
(defining marriage as "the legally recognized union of two people" and extending recognition to
same-sex marriages legally performed in other jurisdictions); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2201(B) (West 2015) (permitting marriage between "two individuals who are not otherwise
prohibited from marrying"); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2015) (defining marriage as "a civil contract
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second common feature of these statutes is the religious exemption that
accompanies the legislative recognition of same-sex marriage. All of
these statutes contain a ministerial exemption for clergy who refuse to
solemnize marriages on the basis of religious objections. 27 Similarly, all
of these statutes but one exempt religious associations, organizations, and
societies from providing accommodations for the solemnization of
marriages to which they have a religious objection or which violate their
beliefs.28
between two persons"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 -a (2015) (defining marriage as "the legally
recognized union of twotwo2two2 people"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-A (2015) (validating
marriages "regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex");
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2015) (defining marriage as "the legally recognized union of two
people"); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(1) (2015) (defining marriage as "a civil contract between
two persons").
27. See D.C. CODE § 46-406(c) (exempting priests, imams, rabbis, ministers, or other
officials of any religious society who is authorized to solemnize or celebrate marriages); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 572-12.1(a) (exempting clergy, ministers, priests, rabbis, and officers of "any
religious denomination or society"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 655-(3) (exempting "any,
member of the clergy"); MD. Civil Marriage Protection Act, 2012 Md. Laws. Ch. 2, sec. 2, § 2202 (H.B. 438) (2012) (to be codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-202(c)(2))
(exempting officials of"a religious order or body"); MINN. STAT. § 517.09(2) (exempting licensed
or ordained members of the clergy); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(II) (exempting "any
individual who is managed, directed, or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious
organization, association, or society"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I 1(1 )(A) (exempting clergymen or
ministers of "any religion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (exempting clergy authorized by
state law to solemnize marriages); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(4) (exempting ministers,
priests, imams, rabbis and other "similar officials of any religious organization"). The exemption'
is broadest in Delaware where any person authorized to solemnize a marriage, including, but not
limited to, clergypersons and ministers, may refuse to do so for any reason whatsoever withoutpenalty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106(e).
28. See D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1) (exempting religious societies and nonprofit
organizations that are "operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with" such
societies); lAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12.2(a) (exempting religious societies and nonprofit
organizations that are "operated, supervised, or controlled by" such societies); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 655-(3) (exempting "any church, religious denomination or other religious
institution"); MD. CIVIL MARRIAGE PROTECTION ACT, 2012 Md. Laws. Ch. 2, sec. 2, § 2-202 (H. B.

438) (2012) (to be codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-202(c)(3) (exempting
religious organizations, associations and societies and nonprofit institutions and organizations
subject to their supervision or control); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.26(2), 517.09(3) (exempting
religious associations, corporations and societies and nonprofit institutions subject to their
supervision or control); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §457:37(111) (exempting religious organizations,
associations, and societies and any nonprofit institution or organization "operated, supervised, or
controlled by or in conjunction with" such organizations, associations, and societies); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (exempting religious corporations and nonprofit corporations subject to their
supervision or control); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296( 1) (exempting religious or denominational
institutions and organizations or charitable organizations "operated, supervised, or controlled by
or in connection with" such institutions and organizations); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(1)
(exempting religious organizations, associations, societies and nonprofit institutions and
organizations "operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with" such organizations,
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However, only three of the ten statutes explicitly define "religion" or
"religious associations, organizations and societies." The most
comprehensive definition is set forth in the District of Columbia marriage
ordinance. "Religious societies" are voluntary associations of individuals
for "religious purposes." 2 9 It is clear from the use of the term "individual"
that membership in such societies is limited to natural persons. The
ordinance further elaborates upon what purposes are deemed "religious."
Specifically, in order for a purpose to be "religious," it must include or
pertain to "a belief in a theological doctrine, a belief in and worship of a
divine ruling power, a recognition of a supernatural power controlling
man's destiny, or a devotion to some principle, strict fidelity or
faithfulness, conscientiousness, pious affection, or attachment."30
The definitions in the remaining two statutes are much less detailed.
New York's marriage statute makes specific reference to definitions
contained within the state's religious corporation law.3 The religious
corporation law requires such organizations to consist of "members" who
meet for "divine worship or other religious observances." 32 What
constitutes "divine worship" or "religious observances" remain
undefined as does whether "members" are restricted to individuals or can
consist of non-natural persons. The definition of a "religious
organization" for purposes of the ministerial exemption in Washington is
more detailed. Although failing to explicitly define "religion," the
Washington marriage statute nevertheless includes "churches, mosques,
synagogues, temples, nondenominational ministries, interdenominational
and ecumenical organizations, mission organizations, faith-based social
principal purpose is the study, practice,
agencies, and other entities whose
33
religion."
of
or advancement
Religious exemptions also vary among jurisdictions. For example,
although Delaware allows any person authorized to solemnize a marriage
to refuse to do so for any reason whatsoever, this exemption is not
associations, or societies); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(5) (exempting religious organizations).
29. D.C. CODE § 46-406(a)(3) (2013).
30. Id. § 46-406(a)(2) (2013).
31. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I 0-b(l).
32. N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2. This section also defines "clergymen" and "ministers" to
include:

A duly authorized pastor, rector, priest, rabbi ... and a person having authority
from, or in accordance with, the rules and regulations of the governing
ecclesiastical body of the denomination or order, if any, to which the church
belongs, or otherwise from the church or synagogue to preside over and direct
the spiritual affairs of the church or synagogue.
Id.
33. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.007,26.04.010 (2012)
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applicable to clerks of the peace and deputies who are expressly required
to solemnize marriages if requested by the applicants.34 Religious
organizations, associations and societies in Maryland are prohibited from
denying "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges" to an individual if the request relates to the promotion of
marriage through governmentally-funded social or religious programs or
secular business activities from
services.35 Minnesota expressly excludes 36
its exemption for religious organizations.
The final common feature of Category One statutes is the prohibition
upon discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation. However, these statutes are not uniform. For example, the
statutes differ in their definition of public accommodations. Two statutes
contain broad definitions which include any establishment offering goods
or services to the public. 37 The remaining statutes list establishments
considered to be "public accommodations."3 8 The listed establishments
primarily focus on lodging of transient guests, establishments serving
food and beverages, places of exhibition, amusement and recreation,
retail establishments offering39goods, services and recreation to the public,

and transportation facilities.
34.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106(e) (2015).

35. See Civil Marriage Protection Act, 2012 MD. Laws. Ch. 2,sec. 2,§ 2-202 (H.B.438)
(2012) (to be codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-202(c)(3)(a)(2)) (2015).
36. See MINN. STAT. § 517.09(3) (2015) (defining "secular business activities" as "conduct
...unrelated to the religious and educational purposes" for which the religious association,
corporation or society was organized).
37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502(14 (2015) ("any establishment which caters to or
offers goods or services or facilities to, or solicits patronage from, the general public"); VT. STAT.
ANN tit. 9, § 4501(1) (2015) ("any school, restaurant, store, establishment or other facility at which
services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits or accommodations are offered to the
general public").
38. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2(1-12) (2015) ("a business, accommodation, refreshment,
entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made
available to the public as customers, clients, or visitors" followed by a list of twelve specific types
of establishments); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8)(A-N) (2015) ("[A] facility, operated by
a public or private entity, whose operations fall within at least one of the following [fourteen]
categories"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:2(XIV) (2015) (an "establishment which caters or
offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public" with twenty specific examples of
such establishments); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (2015) (all places offering lodging to transient guests,
establishments serving food or beverages, places of exhibition, amusement and recreation,
wholesalers and retailers offering goods, services and recreation to the public, and transportation
facilities followed by a list of 51 types of establishments but specifically excluding public
educational institutions); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(2) (2015) ("any place, licensed or
unlicensed, kept for gain, hire, or reward, or where charges are made for admission, service,
occupancy, or use of any property or facilities" followed by a list of twenty-three types of
locations).
39. Maryland's statute encapsulates these general areas of coverage through its application
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By contrast, the sections of these statutes identifying protected classes
are relatively uniform. All of these statutes include heterosexuality,
homosexuality and bisexuality within the term "sexual orientation."40
The statutes, with the exceptions of Delaware and Vermont, specifically
include perceived orientation within the definition of "sexual
orientation." 41 However, only42 eight of these statutes expressly include
gender identity or expression.
Practices that may be deemed discriminatory also vary among
Category One statutes. Eight of the ten statutes prohibit acts that aid or
abet discrimination in public accommodations. 43 However, only five of
to lodging of transient guests, facilities principally engaged in the sale of food or alcoholic
beverages, all places of exhibition or entertainment and retail establishments offering goods,
services, entertainment, recreation or transportation to the public without a further detailed list of
facilities or businesses. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-301. See also D.C. CODE § 21401.02(24) (2015); MINN. STAT. § 363A.02(34).
40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502(16); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(28); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 489-2(12); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-101(f);
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21:49;N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(27); VT. STAT.
ANN tit. 1,§ 143; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(26).
41. See D.C. CODE §2-1402.31(a); HAW. REV. STAT. §489-2(12); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 4553(9-C); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-101(0; MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 21:49; N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(27); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(26). The
Delaware statute makes no reference to perceived sexual orientation but does state that it "shall
be liberally construed to the end that the rights herein provided for all people, without regard to
... sexual orientation may be effectively safeguarded" from which it may be concluded that
discrimination on the basis of perceived sexual orientation would be prohibited. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 4501. Vermont's statute does not distinguish between actual and perceived orientation.
See VT. STAT. ANN tit. 1, § 143. The questionnaire utilized by the Civil Rights Unit of the Vermont
Attorney General's Office allows for aggrieved persons to file a complaint with respect to
perceived orientation, but the Vermont Human Rights Commission does not make this distinction
in the complaint form utilized in employment discrimination cases. See ANTI-DSCRIMINATION
LAW IN VERMONT,GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS (2014), http://www.glad.org/
rights/vermont/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-vermont.
42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4503; D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(1); HAW. REV. STAT. § 4893; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-304; MINN. STAT.
§ 363A.1 I(1)(a); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 9, § 4502(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215(1).
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(a), (c) (indirect participation in unlawful
discriminatory practices or assisting, inducing, inciting or coercing another person to engage in
such practices); D.C. CODE §§ 2-1402.31 (a)(1), 2-1402.61 (a), 2-1402.62 (indirect participation in
unlawful discriminatory practices, denying equal access to public accommodations through
coercion, threats, or retaliation, and aiding and abetting unlawful discriminatory practices); RAW.
REV. STAT. § 489-5(a)(2) (conspiracies to aid, abet, incite, or coerce a person to engage in
discriminatory practices); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553(10)(D), 4592(1) (aiding, abetting,
inciting, compelling or coercing unlawful discriminatory practices and indirect participation in
such practices); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-801(1)(aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling
or coercing another person to engage in unlawful discriminatory practices); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 354-A:2(XV)(d), A: 17 (aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or coercing another person to
engage in unlawful discriminatory practices and indirect participation in such practices); N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 296(2)(a) (indirect participation in unlawful discriminatory practices); WASH. REV.
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the statutes expressly prohibit the publication, posting, circulation or
other dissemination of written or electronic communications that the
patronage of certain persons will be refused or denied or that such persons
are unwelcome, objectionable, or undesirable.4 4 Only one statute defines
discriminatory practices to include refusals 4 5of service based upon
association with a member of a protected class.
C. Category Two Statutes
Category Two statutes are currently in force in seven states,
specifically, California, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon,
and Utah. Category Two statutes are those containing exemptions for
religious organizations and individuals within the body of existing public
accommodations laws themselves or by applicable case law. Recognition
of same-sex marriage was the result of judicial opinion in each of these
states.46
Despite their inclusion of religious exemptions, Category Two
statutes differ in several ways. The primary difference is whether sexual
orientation is designated as a protected class for purposes of public
accommodations discrimination. Two states, Nebraska and Utah, do not
47
include sexual orientation in their respective lists of protected classes.
The remaining states specifically prohibit discrimination in public
48
accommodations on the basis of actual and perceived sexual orientation 49
and, with the exception of New Jersey, gender identity and expression.
Six of the states define "public accommodations," but these
definitions differ from one another.5 ° Three states define "public
CODE §§ 49.60.215(1), 220 (indirect participation in unlawful discriminatory practices and aiding,
abetting, encouraging or inciting such practices).
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(b) ("any written, typewritten, mimeographed,
printed or radio communications"); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31 (a)(2) ("a statement, advertisement, or
sign"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592(2) ("a notice or advertisement"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 354-A: 17 ("a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement"); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296(2)(a) ("a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement").
45. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.15 (2015).
46. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
47. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-134 (2015) (defining protected classes to include race, creed,
color, gender, religion, national origin, and ancestry); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (West 2015)
(defining protected classes to include race, color, gender, religion, ancestry, and national origin).
48. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-51.5(a) (West 2015); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(s) (West
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-301(7), 24-34-601 (2015); IOWA CODE §§ 216.2(14), 216.7
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 174.100 (66767), 659A.003-.006,

659A.406-09, 659A.885 (2015).
49. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2); IOWA CODE §
216.7(1)(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403.
50. The California statute does not use the term "public accommodations." See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 51.5 ( "No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against,
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accommodations" very broadly to include any establishment offering
goods or services to the public. 5 1 The Colorado and New Jersey statutes
contain lengthy lists of establishments considered to be "public
accommodations." 5 2 Nebraska's statute is much narrower and applies
only to lodging of transient guests, facilities principally engaged in the
sale of food, gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment and
facilities owned, operated, or managed by the state or any agency or
subdivision thereof while omitting establishments serving beverages,
retail establishments offering goods and services to the public, and
53
transportation facilities.
Discriminatory practices also vary among Category Two statutes.
Four statutes prohibit aiding or abetting discrimination.5 4 Two of the
seven statutes expressly prohibit the publication, posting, circulation or
other dissemination of written or electronic communications that the
boycott or blacklist, or refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person.., on
account of any characteristic listed [herein]"). The term "business establishment" is to be
interpreted "in the broadest sense reasonably possible." Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy
Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 236 (Cal. 1998). The term has been applied to for-profit commercial
enterprises and non-profit organizations with an underlying business or economic purpose. See,
e.g., Stevens v. Optimum Health Inst., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1088-89 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (religious
organization); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 431 (Cal. 1983)
(condominium association); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs., 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 221-26
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (non-profit civic association). But see Curran,952 P.2d at 236 (holding that
charitable organizations whose activities are not related to economic purposes are not business
establishments within the meaning of the public accommodation statute).
51. See IOWA CODE § 216.2(13)(a) ("[E]ach and every place, establishment, or facility of
whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods for a fee or charge
to nonmembers of any organization or association utilizing the place, establishment, or facility..
" and all such places, establishments, or facilities that offer services, facilities, or goods
gratuitously if they receive governmental support or a subsidy); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.400(1)
("[A]ny place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or
privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements or otherwise...");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-2(l)(a) ("[E]very place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind,
nature, or class that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee
or charge...").
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 ("[A]ny place of business engaged in any sales to
the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
to the public..." followed by a list of thirty-eight specific types of establishments); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-5(1) (providing all places offering lodging to transient guests, establishments serving
food or beverages, places of exhibition, amusement and recreation, producers, manufacturers,
wholesalers, distributors and retailers offering goods, services and recreation to the public,
transportation facilities, and educational institutions at any level followed by a list of twenty-nine
specific types of establishments).
53. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-133(1-6)(2015).
54. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 52(a) (aiding or inciting discriminatory practices); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (indirect participation in unlawful discriminatory practices); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 20-135 (aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or coercing discriminatory practices); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659A.406 (aiding or abetting unlawful discriminatory practices).
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patronage of certain persons will be refused or denied or that such persons
are unwelcome, objectionable, or undesirable. 5 California also prohibits
discrimination against third persons on the basis of their association with
members of a protected class.56
Religious exemptions exist in each of the Category Two statutes but
vary with respect to identification of the persons and organizations
entitled to their utilization. As a general rule, the majority of Category
Two statutes exclude places utilized for religious purposes from the
definition of public accommodations 57 or specifically exempt religious
organizations from compliance. 58 However, unlike Iowa and Nebraska,
Oregon's exemption is inapplicable to decisions regarding the use of
facilities that are "connected with a commercial or business activity that
has no necessary relationship to the church or institution." 59 The New
Jersey and California exemptions are outliers to these general principles.
New Jersey limits its exemption to "any educational facility operated or
maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution." 60 The
legality of any exemption granted for religious purposes in California is
to be determined by application of the standards set forth in Employment
Division v. Smith.6t One uniform feature of these exemptions is the
complete absence of definitions of "religion," "bona fide religious
purpose," and "bona fide religious associations, institutions, and
organizations."
55. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2) ("[A]ny written, electronic, or printed
communication, notice, or advertisement . . .");OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.409 ("[Any
communication, notice, advertisement or sign of any kind....
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a).
57. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1)(excluding churches, synagogues, mosques,
and other places that are "principally used for religious purposes" from the definition of public
accommodations).
58. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.7(2)(a) (2015) (stating that the public accommodation
statute shall not apply to "[A]ny bona fide religious institution with respect to any qualifications
the institution may impose based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity when such
qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-137 (exempting
public accommodations owned or operated by a "religious corporation, association, or society" to
the extent that they give preferences to the use of such accommodations to members of the same
faith as that of the administering body); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.006(3) (permitting "a bona fide
church or other religious organization" to regulate the use of its facilities based upon "a bona fide
religious belief about sexual orientation as long as ...the use of facilities is closely connected
with or related to the primary purposes of the church or institution").
59. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.006(3).
60. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (2015).
61. See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959, 966-68
(Cal. 2008) (concluding that the Unruh Civil Rights Act was "a valid and neutral law of general
applicability," that the Act furthered "California's compelling interest in ensuring full and equal
access to medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation" and that there were "no less
restrictive means for the state to achieve that goal" (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 879 (1990)).
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D. Category Three Statutes
Category Three statutes are currently in force in Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Category Three statutes are
those containing exemptions for religious organizations and individuals
through RFRAs or similarly-titled legislation. Recognition of same-sex
marriage was the result ofjudicial opinion in each of these states.62 None
of these statutes prohibit discrimination in public accommodations on the
basis of sexual orientation. 63 However, Indiana's RFRA specifically
provides that it may not serve as a basis for denying access to public
64
accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.
All but one of the Category Three statutes define "public
accommodations." 65 Five states define "public accommodations" to
66
include any establishment offering goods or services to the public.
62. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
63. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442 (A) (2015) (limiting coverage to race, color,
religion, gender, national origin and ancestry); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(2) (2015)
(defining protected classes to include gender, disability, race, religion, and national origin); FLA.
STAT. § 760.08 (2015) (limiting coverage to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, handicap,
and marital status); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5901(2) (WEST 2015) (limiting coverage to race, color,
religion, gender, and national origin); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2(a-b) (2015) (defining protected
classes to include gender, disability, race, color, religion, national origin, and ancestry); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 51:2447244722447 (2015) (limiting coverage to race, color, creed, religion, gender, age,
national origin, and disability); MO. REv. STAT. § 213.065(2) (2015) (limiting coverage to race,
color, religion, gender, national origin, disability, and ancestry); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1402 (2015)
(limiting coverage to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, and disability); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 955(i)(1) (2015) (limiting coverage to race, color, religious creed, gender, national
origin, ancestry, handicap, and disability); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-9-10(A) (2015) (limiting
coverage to race, color, religion, and national origin); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (2015)
(limiting coverage to race, color, creed, religion, gender, national origin, and age); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.2-3901 (2015) (limiting coverage to race, color, religion, gender, pregnancy, childbirth,
national origin, age, marital status, and disability).
64. See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7. (2015)
65. Virginia's statute does not expressly define the term "public accommodations."
However, it may be inferred from applicable case law that Virginia adheres to the definition of
public accommodations found in Title 1Iof the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Grimes v. Canadian
Am. Transp., C.A.T. (U.S.), Inc., 72 F. Supp.2d 629, 634 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Virginia
Human Rights Act essentially makes any federal violation a violation of Virginia law as well").
See also infra note 150 and accompanying text.
66. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441(2) (2015) ("[All establishments which cater or
offer their services, facilities or goods to or solicit patronage from the members of the general
public .... ."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7) (2015) ("[A]ny place, store, or other
establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies accommodations, goods, or services to
the general public, or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or that
is supported directly or indirectly by government funds .... "); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5902(9)
("[A] business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility
of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
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Pennsylvania's statute has a lengthy list of establishments considered to
be "public accommodations." 67 Oklahoma's statute is narrower as a result
68
of its exclusion of certain types of establishments from its definition.
Missouri's statute is narrower still and applies only to lodging of transient
guests, facilities principally engaged in the sale of food for consumption
on the premises, gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment
and facilities owned, operated, or managed by the state or any agency or
or
subdivision thereof.69 Florida's statute omits state-owned, operated,
70
managed facilities from its definition of public accommodations.

South

Carolina's statute is the narrowest of all and is limited to those
or local
establishments required to obtain a license or permit from state
71
governmental authorities as a condition of lawful operation.
Category Three statutes are less protective with respect to actions
associated with denial of access to public accommodations than their
Category One and Two counterparts. Four Category Three statutes
prohibit the publication, posting, circulation or other dissemination of
written or electronic communications that the patronage of persons will
be refused or denied or that persons are unwelcome, objectionable, or
undesirable based upon their membership in a protected class, 72 and only
accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.
IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (2015) "[A]ny establishment that caters or offers its services or facilities
");LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2232(10) ("[Any place, store, or
or goods to the general public ....
other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services to the general
public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or which is
supported directly or indirectly by government funds .. ";TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(15)"
(2015) ("[A]ny place, store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies
goods or services to the general public or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the
").
general public, or that is supported directly or indirectly by government funds ....
67. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 954( (2015) ("any accommodation, resort or amusement
which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public" followed by a list of fiftyeight specific types of establishments).
68. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1401(1) (2015) ("any place, store, or other establishment,
either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services to the general public or which
solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or which is supported directly or
indirectly by government funds" but specifically excluding barber and beauty shops and
"privately-owned resort or amusement establishments").
69. See Mo. REV. STAT. §213.010(15(2015).
70. See FLA. STAT. § 760.02(1 )(a)-(d) (2015).
71. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-9-1 0(B)(l)-(6) (2015).
72. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5902(5) (2015) (any "statement, advertisement or sign");
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2248 (2015) (any "written, printed, oral, or visual communication,
notice, or advertisement"); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 954(i)(2) ("any advertisement and any similar
written, printed, taped, or broadcast communication, notice, statement or the like § 954(i)(2)
("any"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-502 (2015) (any "written, printed, oral or visual communication,
notice or advertisement"). Ironically, Virginia prohibits the publication, posting, circulation or
other dissemination of written or electronic communications that the patronage of persons will be
refused or denied or that persons are unwelcome, objectionable, or undesirable based upon their
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one statute expressly prohibits acts that aid or abet discrimination.73 None
of the Category Three statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of
association with members of a protected class.
The hallmark of Category Three states is exemptions for religious
organizations and individuals through RFRAs or similarly-titled
legislation. The uniformity of these RFRAs is unsurprising given the
blueprint provided by the federal RFRA. 7 ' Ten of these RFRAs adopt the
federal standard of prohibiting governmental actions that "substantially
burden" the exercise of religion. 75 Missouri's RFRA utilizes the term
"burden" without the adjective "substantial. 76 Indiana's RFRA not only
prohibits substantial burdens upon the exercise of religion but also actions
that are "likely" to result in a substantial burden regardless of whether
77
such actions are engaged in by the government or a private individual.
Eight states expressly define the term "substantial burden" but utilize
three different definitions." 78 The most specific definitions are those in
the Pennsylvania and Louisiana RFRAs. 79 Pennsylvania prohibits
governmental actions constraining religiously-motivated conduct,
expression and activities or compelling conduct, or expression in
violation of a person's religious faith.80 Perhaps equally broad is the
religion. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.1(2) (2015).
73. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442(B) (2015) (aiding or inciting discriminatory
practices).
74. See generally42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2015).
75. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(B (2015);ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-404(a)
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1 (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(2 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:5233; (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253(A) (2015); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2402(1 (2002); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-32-40; (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1 -407(b (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B
(2009). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- 1 (a) (providing that the "[glovernment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion..." except as otherwise provided therein).
76. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.307(2) (2015).
77. IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (2015).
78. The terms "burden" and "substantial burden" are not defined in the Arkansas, Indiana,
Missouri and South Carolina RFRAs. But see ARK. Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 2015-075 (Aug. 5,2015),
availableat 2015 WL 4734478, at *6 (opining that an Arkansas court interpreting this provision
would define a "substantial burden" as a government action which compels a claimant to refrain
from religiously-motivated conduct).
79.

See 71 PA. CONS. STAT.

80. 71 PA. CONS. STAT.
governmental action that:

§ 2403.

(2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

13:5234.

§ 2403. "Substantial burdens" upon religion are defined as

(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by a
person's sincerely held religious beliefs.
(2) Significantly curtails a person's ability to express adherence to the person's
religious faith.
(3) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which are
fundamental to the person's religion.
(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of a person's
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definition shared by Idaho, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia providing
that a "substantial burden" is governmental action that "inhibit[s] or
curtail[s] religiously motivated practices."' 1 By contrast, Arizona's act
defines "substantial burden" as intended to ensure that "trivial, technical
infractions" resulting from governmental actions are not
or de minimis
82
actionable.
There is some uniformity with respect to other definitions contained
in these RFRAs. Five states define the exercise of religion through
specific reference to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or
religious protections provided in state constitutions. 83 Six states share a
more detailed definition in which the "exercise of religion" is "the ability
to act or refusal to act in a manner substantially motivated by a religious
belief, whether or not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger
system of religious belief."84 Louisiana's RFRA includes this language

as well as specific references to the First85 Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution.
However, the parties that may exercise religion remain vague as only
four states define affected "persons," and these definitions vary
considerably. 86 The question of whether free exercise rights may be
religious faith ....
Id.The Louisiana RFRA is identical but removes the adjectives "significantly" in subsection one
and "specific" in subsection four which potentially broadens the definition. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:5234(2)(a-d) (2010).
81. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(5) (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 252(7) (2015); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-1-407(a)(7) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(A) (2015).
82. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §41-1493.01(E) (2015). See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(5'.
(2015). Such potentially limiting language is not found in the Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia
RFRAs. Florida has defined the term "substantial burden" through case law. See Warner v. City
of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1033 (Fla. 2004) (limiting "significant burden" to instances
where the government either "compels the religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion
forbids ...or forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion requires").
83. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 252(2) (2000) (referencing the U.S. and Oklahoma
Constitutions); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2403 (2002) (referencing the Pennsylvania Constitution);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-20(2 (2015) (referencing the U.S. Constitution and the South Carolina
Constitution); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407(a)(2) (2015) (referencing the U.S. and Tennessee
Constitutions); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(A) (2009) (referencing the U.S. and Virginia
Constitutions).
84. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2)(2010); FLA. STAT. § 761.02(3)(2015); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 73-401(2) (2000); IND. CODE § 34-13-9(5) (2015); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302(2) (2015).
Arkansas' RFRA rather meaninglessly defines "exercise of religion" as "religious exercise." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-123-403(2) (2015). But see ARK. OP. A'rr'y GEN. No. 2015-075, supra note 78,
at *5 (opining that an Arkansas court interpreting this provision would require a sincerely-held
religious belief).
85. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5234(5)(2010).
86. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-20(3) (1999) (defining "person" to include "[a]n individual,
corporation, firm, partnership, association, or organization"). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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asserted by organizations remains undecided in the remaining states
although it is most likely that they would follow the U.S. Supreme
Court's lead in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and extend such
rights to at least close corporations. 87 The identity of governmental
actions subject to the prohibitions upon burdening religious exercise is
clearer. All but one RFRA includes rules of general applicability within
their scope, 88 but only four states also include facially neutral laws. 9
The most homogenous sections of these statutes relate to the
applicable constitutional
standards for determining whether
governmental action impermissibly interferes with free exercise rights.
Seven RFRAs reference the first prong of the Sherberttest, specifically,
the requirement that a burden upon the exercise of religion is justified
only in furtherance of a compelling state interest. 90 Five states appear to
13:5234(1 (2010); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2403 (2002) (limiting the definition of "person" to
individuals and churches, associations of churches, and other religious orders, bodies, or
institutions). Louisiana's RFRA was clarified to apply to non-profit and for-profit corporations
by an executive order issued by Governor Bobby Jindal in May 2015, but the order is of
questionable validity to the extent it purports to amend existing state law without legislative
consent. See Exec. Order BJ 15-8, § I (May 19, 2015), available at http://www.doa.
louisiana.gov/osr/other/bj 15-8.htm. See also IND. CODE § 34-13-9(7)(1)-(3) (defining "person" to
include individuals, organizations operated primarily for religious purposes, and any type of
business association regardless of whether it is organized and operated for profit or non-profit
purposes). However, Indiana's RFRA distinguishes between "persons" and "providers" who are
prohibited from refusing to "offer or provide services, facilities, use of public accommodations
[and] goods ... to any member or members of the general public on the basis of race, color,
religion, ancestry, age, national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
United States military service." Id. § 34-13-9-.07. "Providers" include individuals and any form
of business association but not churches, nonprofit religious organizations or societies, religiously
affiliated schools and ministerial personnel. Id. § 34-13-9-7.5.
87. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768-69 (2014) (holding that "protecting the free-exercise rights of
corporations . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those
companies" and that "no conceivable definition of the term [person for purposes of the RFRA]
includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations."). For an
example of a state RFRA adopting this reasoning, see ARK. OP. Arr'Y GEN. No. 2015-075, supra
note 78, at *5 (opining that an Arkansas court would include business associations within the
definition of "person" covered by the state RFRA).
88. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(B) (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-404(a)
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1) (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(2) (2000); IND. CODE § 34-139(8)(a) (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5233; (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253(A) (2000); 71
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2404(a) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40; (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1407(b) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B) (2009). But see Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302(1) (2003)
(exempting restrictions upon free exercise in the form of rules of general applicability).
89. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(A); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(1); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:5233; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2402(1). But see Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302(1)
(exempting restrictions upon free exercise in the form of neutral rules that do not discriminate
against or among religions). Facially neutral laws are not referenced in the Arkansas, Florida,
Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia statutes, and their status pursuant to
these RFRAs remains undecided.
90. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(C)(1); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-404(a)(1);

2016]

PUBLICACCOMMODA7'ON STATUTES, SEXUAL ORIENIOA7T0N AND REIIGIOUSLIBERTY

21

have a higher standard requiring the state to demonstrate that the burden
is "essential to further a compelling governmental interest." 91 Whether
the requirement of essentiality sets a higher standard for burdens upon
the exercise of religion in these states or is merely a drafting anomaly is
uncertain as there is no applicable case law in four of these states.92 The
definition of "compelling state interest" most likely derives from
93
Sherbert as all of the statutes fail to provide a specific definition.
Furthermore, all of these RFRAs except Missouri require that the state
utilize the least restrictive means by which to further its compelling
government's evidentiary
interest.94 Five statutes explicitly define the
95
burden with respect to these requirements.
E.CategoryFour Statutes
Category Four statutes are currently in force in Connecticut, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. Category Four
statutes are those recognizing same-sex marriage either statutorily or by
judicial opinion with accompanying exemptions for religious
organizations and RFRAs. Three of these jurisdictions extended
recognition to same-sex marriage through legislation. 96 Recognition of
FLA. STAT. § 761.03(I)(a); IND.CODE § 34-13-9(8)(b)(1); LA. REV.STAT. ANN. § 13:5233(1); 71
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2404(b)(I); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40(1). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963).
91. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(3)(a); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302(1)-(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51,
§ 253(B)(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407(b)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B)(i).
92. The difference between the "in furtherance of" and "essentiality" standards has been
discussed in Tennessee. See Johnson v. Levy, No. M2009-02596-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 14, at *22-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010) (holding that the essentiality requirement is
"more than semantics; it reveals that the Tennessee General Assembly intended to provide greater
protection of religious freedom than that afforded by the federal RFRA").
93. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (defining "compelling state interests" as those
").
implicating "only the gravest abuses [and] endangering paramount interests ....
94. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(C)(2); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-404(a)(2);
FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1)(b); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(2)(b); IND. CODE § 34-13-9(8)(b)(2); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5233(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253(B)(2); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2404(b)(2);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407(c)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B)(ii).

But see Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302.1(2) (stating that the governmental act in question may not be
"unduly restrictive").
95. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(1) (clear and convincing evidence); OKLA. STAr. tit.
51, § 252(1) (clear and convincing evidence); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2404(b), 2405() (providing
that "[a government] agency may substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion if the
agency proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the burden is ...[iun furtherance of a
compelling interest of the agency [and] [t]he least restrictive means of furthering the compelling
interest." and that persons asserting violations of the act must prove such claims by clear and
convincing evidence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407(a)(1) (clear and convincing evidence); VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(A) (clear and convincing evidence).
96. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-20(4) (2015); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1, 80/10(a)-(d)
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same-sex marriage was the result ofjudicial opinion in Kansas, Kentucky
and New Mexico. 97 Four of these states prohibit discrimination in public
98
accommodations on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation.
All of the Category Four statutes define "public accommodations,"
but the definitions vary from one another. Three states define "public
accommodations" to include any establishment offering goods or
services to the public. 99 Illinois, Kansas and Rhode Island utilize lists of
establishments considered to be "public accommodations."' 00 Three
statutes prohibit the publication, posting, circulation or other
dissemination of written or electronic communications that the patronage
of persons will be refused or denied or that persons are unwelcome,
objectionable, or undesirable based upon their membership in a protected
class,101 and one statute expressly prohibits acts that aid or abet
discrimination. 10 2 None of these statutes prohibit discrimination on the
basis of association with members of a protected class.
Religious liberty is protected in Category Four statutes through a
combination of exclusions, exemptions and RFRAs. The religious
exclusions contained in the Category Four statutes are diverse. For
(2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, 15-1-8 (2015).
97. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
98. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-81d, 46a-81 1; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102-103, 5/5101-103, 5/8A-104; N.M. STAT. §§ 28-1-2, 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-22. 1. These statutes also expressly include gender identity or expression. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46a-64a(l)-(2); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1 02(A); N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7; 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 1124-2, 2.3. Kansas and Kentucky do not include sexual orientation in their respective lists of
protected classes. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(i)(A) (2015) (defining protected classes to
include race, color, gender, religion, national origin, ancestry, and disability); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 344.120 (2015) (defining protected classes to include race, color, religion, and national
origin).
99. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-63 ("[A]ny establishment which caters or offers its
services or facilities or goods to the general public ....
");KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130 ("[A]ny
place, store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services
to the general public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public or
which is supported directly or indirectly by government funds ...");
N.M. STAT. § 28-1-2(H)
("[Any establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to
the public.....").
100. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-101(A)(1)-(13) (thirteen types of establishments that are
to be considered "public accommodations"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(h) ("[Any person who
caters or offers goods, services, facilities and accommodations to the public" followed by a list of
eighteen types of establishments); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-3 (listing 45 types of
establishments that are to be considered "public accommodations").
101. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-102(B) ("any written communication"); KY. REV.STAT.
ANN. § 344.140 (any "written, printed, oral, or visual communication, notice, or advertisement.
.."); R.I. . GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-2 (any "written, printed or painted communication, notice, or
advertisement ...").
102. See N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7() ("aiding, inciting, compelling or coercing discriminatory
practices....").
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example, the Kansas statute excludes "religious . . . association[s] 0or3

corporations" from the definition of "public accommodations.'
"Religion" is not defined in this exclusion but is defined in Kansas'
subsequently-adopted RFRA.10 4 Kentucky's public accommodation
statute contains a similar exclusion.' 0 5 However, "religion" is not defined
in Kentucky's accompanying RFRA, and the exemption is significantly
limited in the public accommodations statute.' 0 6 Similarly, acts of a
"religious or denominational institution or organization that is operated,
supervised or controlled by or that is operated in connection with" such
institution are excluded from the public accommodation statute in New
Mexico if such acts are "calculated . . . to promote the religious or

denominational principles for which it is established or maintained."1' 7
Unlike Kentucky, New Mexico defines activities constituting the exercise
of religion in its RFRA.108 Illinois excludes the "free exercise of religion
or expression of religiously based views by any individual or group" from
its statute. 109 Acts constituting the "exercise of religion" are to be
determined from Illinois' RFRA." 0 Rhode Island's exclusion is unusual

to the extent that it is contained within the statute's definition of sexual
orientation, merely provides that the inclusion of orientation does not
"impose any duty on a religious organization," and does not define the
terms religion or the exercise thereof."' Connecticut's religious
exclusion is specifically limited to consideration of sexual orientation and
gender identity with respect to employment decisions made by "a
religious corporation, entity, association, educational institution or
society."" 2
The three states that have extended recognition to same-sex marriage
through legislation recognize a ministerial exemption for clergy who3
refuse to solemnize marriages on the basis of religious objections."
103. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(h) (2015).
104. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
105. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.130(3) (West 2015)(excluding religious organizations
and their activities and facilities if the proposed use is inconsistent with religious tenets).
106. Id. § 344.130(3)(a-c) (excluding hate groups from the definition of religious
organizations, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability, race, color, or national origin
regardless of whether the organization is religious, and excluding "nonreligious activities"
sponsored by religious organizations and activities offered to the general public).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-9(B) (2015). The exclusion is unavailable to organizations
that restrict membership on account of race, color, national origin or ancestry. Id.
108. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
109. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-102.1(b) (2015).
110. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2.1 (h) (2015).
11I.
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-81 p, 46a-81aa (2015).
113. See id. § 46b-21(a)-(b) (exempting "clergy" and "church or church-controlled
organizations" as defined in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code). See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/209(a-5) (2015) (exempting "ministers, clergy, or officiants acting as a representative of a

UNIVERSI7Y OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF A W AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 27

These statutes also exempt religious associations, organizations, and
societies from providing accommodations for the solemnization of
marriages to which they have a religious objection or which violate their
beliefs.1 4 The organizational exemptions vary among these statutes. The
most explicit exemption is contained in the Illinois statute. This
exemption is specifically limited to "religious facilities" which are
defined as "sanctuaries, parish halls, fellowship halls, and similar

facilities.""' 5 The Illinois exemption does not include facilities which
serve arguably more secular purposes such as health care and educational

facilities and social service agencies. 1 16 Most important for purposes of
public accommodation law, the Illinois religious facility exemption does

not include "facilities such as businesses." 117 It may be presumed that the
exclusion of business facilities is applicable to facilities owned or
operated by religious organizations, associations or societies and

affiliated organizations which are otherwise made available to members
of the general public without faith-based distinctions and on a for-profit
basis. Unfortunately, the Illinois statute does not further elaborate upon
this exclusion. "Religion" and the free exercise thereof are defined in
Illinois' RFRA. 18 By contrast, the Connecticut and Rhode Island statutes

do not define "religion," "religious organizations, associations or
societies" or "religious facilities."
Religious liberty is also protected in Category Four states through

RFRAs. These RFRAs states closely resemble their counterparts in
Category Three states. Two Category Four RFRAs adopt the federal
standard of prohibiting governmental actions that "substantially burden"
religious denomination"); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3-6. 1(b (2015) (exempting a "regularly licensed
or ordained clergyperson, minister, elder, priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of any church or
religious denomination").
114. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-150d (2015) (exempting a "religious organization,
association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society" from
providing "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges" with respect to
the solemnization or celebration of marriages in violation of its religious beliefs and faith); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/209(a-10) (2015) (exempting churches, mosques, synagogues, temples,
nondenominational ministries, interdenominational or ecumenical organizations, mission
organizations, or other organizations "whose principal purpose is the study, practice or
advancement of religion" from providing "religious facilities" for the solemnization or celebration
of a marriage in violation of their religious beliefs); 15 RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-3-6.1(c) (2015)
(exempting religious organizations, associations, or societies and "any nonprofit institution or
organization operated, supervised or controlled by a religious organization, association or society"
from providing "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges" for the
solemnization, celebration or promotion of marriages in violation of their religious beliefs).
115. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/209(a-10)(2015).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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the exercise of religion.' 9 The Illinois RFRA does not define "substantial
burden," and the Kentucky RFRA merely provides that "burdens"
include, but are not limited to, the withholding of government benefits,
of penalties, and exclusion from programs or access to
the assessment
120
facilities.
The remaining four states have adopted different prohibitions upon
free exercise encroachments. Two statutes prohibit governmental actions
that merely burden the free exercise of religion. Kansas' RFRA prohibits
governmental action that "directly or indirectly constrains, inhibits,
curtails or denies the exercise of religion by any person or compels any
action contrary to a person's exercise of religion" including the
withholding of benefits, assessment of penalties or exclusion from
government programs or access to government facilities.' 2 ' Any such
governmental action is deemed to be a burden upon free exercise.
However, later language contained in the statute prohibits governmental
actions that "substantially burden" the exercise of religion. 122 It may be
concluded from this language that Kansas adheres to the "substantial
burden" test rather than a broader prohibition. By contrast, Connecticutprohibits the state or any subdivision thereof from burdening the exercise
of religion without reference to "substantial."'12 3 New Mexico and Rhode
Island prohibit governmental actions that "restrict" free exercise. 12 4 It is
unclear whether usage of this term instead of "substantial burden" was
intended to expand free exercise rights due to the absence of definitions
in each of these statutes and interpretive case law.
There is also a lack of uniformity among the statutes in defining
protected religious activities, persons, and government action which may
impermissibly interfere with such activities. Three states expressly define*
the exercise of religion by statute in 3 different ways. 125 Kansas defines
the "exercise of religion" by reference to the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and the Kansas Constitution with additional terminology
stating that exercise includes "the right to act or refuse to act in a manner
substantially motivated by a sincerely-held religious tenet or belief,
whether or not the exercise is compulsory or a central part or requirement
of the person's religious tenets or beliefs.' ' 126 Illinois defines the "exercise
of religion" as "an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by
119.
2015).
120.
121.

See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(a)(3) (2015); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(a) (2015).

122.

Id. § 60-5303(a).

123.
124.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b(a) (2015).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (2015); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2015).

125. The term "exercise of religion" is not defined in the Connecticut, Kentucky or Rhode
Island statutes.
126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(c) (2015).
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religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or
central to a larger system of religious belief' without Kansas' specific
reference to sincerity of belief. 127 New Mexico broadly defines the
exercise of religion to include any "act or a refusal to act that is
substantially motivated by religious belief' without reference to the
sincerity of belief 128
or the compulsory or central nature of the purported
exercise.
religious
The parties that may exercise religious freedoms remain vague as only
Kansas' RFRA expressly extends religious rights to for-profit
organizations. 129 It is probable that the remaining states with the
exception of Illinois would follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 130 The identity of governmental
actions subject to the prohibition upon burdening religious exercise is
31
equally fragmented. Five statutes include rules of general applicability,
but only one statute explicitly
provides that facially neutral laws may
32
violate free exercise rights.1
Category Four RFRAs also address constitutional standards for
determining whether governmental actions impermissibly interfere with
free exercise rights. Four RFRAs provide that a governmental burden
upon the exercise of religion is justified only in furtherance of a
compelling state interest. 133 New Mexico and Rhode Island appear to
have a higher standard requiring the state to demonstrate that the burden
is "essential to further a compelling governmental interest." 134 The
meaning of the term "compelling governmental interest" is most likely
derived from Sherbert although only Illinois' RFRA makes specific
127.

775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/5(2015).

128. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-2(A) (2015).
129.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(f) (2015) (defining "person" to mean "any legal person or

entity under the laws of the state of Kansas and the laws of the United States").
130.

See supra note 87 and accompanying text. It is less certain that Illinois courts would

interpret its RFRA to include closely-held businesses given that the religious facility exemption
within its same-sex marriage statute does not include business facilities. See supra note 11 7 and
accompanying text.
131. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b(a) (2015); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15; (2015); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-5303(a) (2015); N.M. STAT. § 28-22-3(A) (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-

3(b)(1) (2015). Kentucky's RFRA does not state whether it includes generally applicable laws.
132. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(a)(2) (2015) (stating that "[I]aws 'neutral' toward
religion, as well as laws intended to interfere with the exercise of religion, may burden the exercise
of religion"). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3(A) (2015) (exempting restrictions upon free

exercise in the form of neutral rules that do not directly discriminate against or among religions);
42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3(b)(1) (exempting restrictions upon free exercise in the form of

neutral rules that do not intentionally discriminate against or among religions). Facially neutral
laws are not referenced in the Connecticut, Kansas and Kentucky statutes.
133. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b(b)(l); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-5303(a)(1) (2015); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2015).
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3(B); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3(b)(2).
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reference to the opinion. 135 The Kansas RFRA explicitly defines the term,
but it is uncertain whether this definition is intended to establish a
different standard than that set forth in Sherbert.136 All Category Four
states require that the state utilize the least restrictive means by which to
further its compelling interest. 37 Two states explicitly define 1 the
38
government's evidentiary burden with respect to these requirements.
F. Category Five Statutes
Category Five statutes are currently in force in Alaska, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Category Five statutes are those that
do not contain explicit religious exemptions and do not have an
accompanying RFRA. Recognition of same-sex marriage was the result
ofjudicial opinion in all of these states. ' Three of these statutes prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation.14 The remaining statutes do not include sexual orientation in
their lists of protected classes.' 41
135. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(a)(6) (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) as providing "a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing governmental interests"). But see State v. Bent,
328 P.3d 677, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that guidance from the federal RFRA was
"misplaced" given the differences between the federal statute and the New Mexico RFRA).
136. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5304 (2015) (defining "compelling state interest" as "only
those interests of the highest order and not otherwise served" and further stating that "[t]he
religious liberty interest protected by this act is an independent liberty that occupies a preferred
position").
137.

See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b(b)(2); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15(ii); KAN. STAT.

ANN. § 60-5303(a)(2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3(B); 42 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3(b)(2).
138. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5303(a) (clear and convincing evidence); KY. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 446.350 (clear and convincing evidence).
139. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
140. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 233.010,
651.050-.070 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 106.52(3) (2014). All of these statutes include actual and
perceived sexual orientation. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151, § 3(6) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 651.050(4); WIS. STAT. § 11 1.32(13m (201420142014). However, only one of these statutes
includes gender identity or expression. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.070. Each of the statutes
identify numerous other protected classes. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (class, creed,
denomination, sect, race, color, gender, nationality and disability); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.070
(race, color, religion, national origin, and disability); WIS. STAT. § 106.52(3)(a)(1) (race, color,
creed, religion, national origin, ancestry, and disability).
141. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230(a)(1) (2015) (defining protected classes to include
gender, disability, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, race, religion, color, and national
origin); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2302(a) (2014) (defining protected classes to include race, color,
religion, national origin, age, gender, and marital status); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304(1)(a)
(2015) (defining protected classes to include gender, marital status, age, race, color, creed,
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All of the Category Five statutes def'me "public accommodations," but
these definitions vary. Seven states define "public accommodations" very
broadly to include any establishment offering goods or services to the
public. 4 2 Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana, and Nevada have lengthy
143
lists of establishments considered to be "public accommodations."'
Category Five statutes also are similar to statutes in the other
categories with respect to actions associated with denial of access to
public accommodations. Seven Category Five statutes prohibit the
publication, posting, circulation or other dissemination of written or
electronic communications that the patronage of persons will be refused
or denied or that persons are unwelcome, objectionable, or undesirable
based upon their membership in a protected class,'" and five statutes
religion, disability, and national origin); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-16 (2015) (defining
protected classes to include gender, disability, age, marital status, race, religion, color, national
origin, and receipt of public assistance); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2015)
(defining protected classes to include gender, disability, age, race, religion, color, national origin,
ancestry, and military status); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-23 (2015) (defining protected classes
to include gender, disability, race, color, creed, religion, national origin, and ancestry); W. VA.
CODE § 5-1 1-9(6)(A) (2015) (defining protected classes to include gender, disability, age, race,
color, religion, national origin, and ancestry); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-101(a) (2015) (defining
protected classes to include gender, race, color, religion, and national origin).
142. See MICH. COM. LAWS § 37.2301(a) (2014) ("a business, or an educational,
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or institution of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(14) (2015) ("every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind,
nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee,
charge, or gratuity"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(9) (West 2015) ("any inn, restaurant,
eating house, barbershop, public conveyance by air, land, or water, theater, store, other place for
the sale of merchandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement of which the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges are available to the public"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 20-13-1(12) (2015) ("any place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or
class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, charge, or
gratuitously"); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-30) (2015) ("any establishment or person ...which offers its
services, goods, facilities or accommodations to the general public"); WIs. STAT. § 106.52(l)(e)(1)
("any place where accommodations, amusement, goods, or services are available either free or for
a consideration"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-101(a) ("all places or agencies which are public in
nature, or which invite the patronage of the public").
143. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(16) (2015) ("a place that caters or offers its services,
goods, or facilities to the general public" followed by a list of 25 types of establishments); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A ("any place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which is open to and
accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public" followed by a list of 39 types of
establishments); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(20)(a) (2015) ("a place that caters or offers its
services, goods, or facilities to the general public" followed by a list of 29 types of
establishments); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050(3) (listing 70 separate types of establishments that
are to be considered "public accommodations").
144. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230(a)(2)(A) ("written or printed communication, notice, or
advertisement"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A ("any advertisement, circular, folder, book,
pamphlet, written or painted or printed notice or sign"); MICHI. CowP. LAWS § 37.2302(b)
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expressly prohibit acts that aid or abet discrimination. 145 None of the
Category Five statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of association
with members of a protected class.
Category Five statutes do not contain explicit religious exemptions,
and there are no accompanying RFRAs. Faith-based objections to
compliance with public accommodations statutes are not, however,
without remedy. Compelled compliance in specific circumstances may
violate state constitutional provisions recognizing and protecting
religious liberty. 46 Additionally, any governmental actions purported to
infringe on religious liberty in the context of ensuring equal access to
public accommodations are likely to be subjected to rigorous
("statement, advertisement, notice, or sign"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304(1)(b) ("written or
printed communication, notice, or advertisement"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-16 ((advertising
or publicizing); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(6)(B) ("any written or printed communication, notice or
advertisement"); WIs. STAT. § 106.52(3)(a)(3) ("any written communication").
145. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (indirect participation in unlawful
discriminatory practices and aiding or inciting such practices); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2701(b)
(2014) (aiding, abetting, inciting, or compelling discriminatory practices); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1402.4-01(2015) (aiding, abetting, or inducing discriminatory practices); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.02(J) (aiding, abetting, inciting, or compelling discriminatory practices); W. VA. CODE § 511-9(7)(A) (aiding, abetting, inciting, or compelling discriminatory practices).
146. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 4 (providing that "[n]o law shall be made
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]"); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § I (stating that "[n]o law
shall be passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion"); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (providing that
"[e]very person shall be at liberty to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience"
and "[t]he civil and political rights, privileges and capacities of no person shall be diminished or
enlarged on account of his religious belief'); MONT. CONST. art. 11,§ 5 (providing that "[t]he state
shall make no law .... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]"); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4 (stating
that "[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination"
or preference shall forever be allowed in this State . . . [as long as such practices are not]
inconsistent with the peace, or safety of this State"); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3 (stating that "It]he
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference shall be forever guaranteed in this state . . . [as long as such practices are not]
inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state"); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7 (stating that "[a]ll men
have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own conscience" and prohibiting "any interference with the rights of conscience"); S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 3 (stating that "[tihe right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience shall
never be infringed .... [and] [n]o person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or
position on account of his religious opinions ... [as long as the exercise of such liberty is not]
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state"); W. VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 15 (providing that no
man shall be "restrained, molested or burdened, in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer, on
account of his religious opinions or belief' and that "all men shall be free to profess and by
argument, to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and the same shall in nowise, affect,
diminish or enlarge their civil capacities"); WIs. CONST. art. Il1, § 18 (stating that free exercise
rights "shall never be infringed ... nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of
conscience be permitted"); WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (stating that "[tihe free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall be
forever guaranteed in this state . . . but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to... justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state").
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147
constitutional scrutiny.

G. CategorySix Statutes
Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and Texas have laws
potentially applicable to public accommodations but lack specific
statutes. Recognition of same-sex marriage was the result of judicial
opinion in these states. 148 Alabama,
Mississippi and Texas protect
49
religious liberty through RFRAs.1
It is implicit that these states will comply with the public
accommodation provisions contained within Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.150 Additionally, statutes in some of these states imply equal
147. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Alaska 1979) (holding that the
fundamental issues in cases implicating religious conduct are whether there is a "very strong state
interest" in compliance with the law in question and whether that interest, or any other, will "suffer
if an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice at issue"); Commonwealth v.
Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Mass. 1989) (requiring governmental intrusions upon
religious liberty be supported by "an overriding governmental interest . . . and the practical
impossibility of [serving such interest] and at the same time accommodating religious freedom");
Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ohio 2000) (applying the compelling state interest
and least restrictive means tests to governmental regulations that purportedly violate religious
liberties); Peace Lutheran Church & Acad. v. Vill. of Sussex, 631 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001) (applying the compelling state interest and least restrictive means tests to
governmental regulations that purportedly violate religious liberties).
148. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
149. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (2014); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
110.001-.-012 (West 201 I). Alabama's provisions with respect to religious liberty are set forth in
the state constitution. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01.
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."). "Public accommodations" are defined
as:
(I)
(2)

(3)
(4)

any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging
to transient guests...
any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain,
or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption
on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility
located on the premises of any retail establishment, or any gasoline
station;
any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection,
or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such
covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving
patrons of any such covered establishment.
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access to certain facilities as a matter of state law in circumscribed
circumstances. For example, Georgia requires an innkeeper who
advertises himself as such as "bound to receive as guests.., all persons
of good character... who are willing to comply with his rules."'' Texas
conditions eligibility for participation in its information logo sign and
tourist-oriented directional sign programs upon compliance with federal
52
laws guaranteeing non-discriminatory access to certain facilities.'
Additionally, permits to sell alcoholic beverages issued by the state of
Texas are subject to suspension or cancellation if the permit holder has
been convicted of "discrimination against an individual on the basis the
individual's race, color, creed, or national origin" occurring "on the
licensed premises or in connection with the operation of the permittee's
business."'1 53 By contrast, Mississippi statutes appear to head in the
opposite direction. Specifically, any so-called "public business, trade and
profession" operating in the state are authorized to select persons with
whom they transact business and "refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve any
person that the owner, manager or employee of such public place of.
business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or serve." 154 Furthermore,
public businesses, trades and professions are authorized to post notices
that management reserves the right to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve
any person in its absolute discretion. 155 The continuing viability of these
1942 code sections are doubtful in light of the passage of Title II of the
Id. § 2000a(b). The operations of establishments affecting commerce in a manner sufficient to
trigger the Act's protections are circumscribed. For example, a food service establishment is
within the scope of the Act only if"it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial
portion of the food which it serves or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in
commerce." Id. § 2000a(c)(2). A place offering exhibitions and entertainment is covered only if
it "customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of
entertainment which move in commerce." Id. § 2000a(c)(3). "Commerce" is defined as "travel,
trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication" among the states, among the states
and the District of Columbia, or among the states or the District of Columbia and a foreign
country, territory or possession. Id. § 2000a(c)(4). These requirements potentially exclude certain
types of establishments that hold themselves out to the public but are more intimate and personal
in the services that they provide. For example, establishments providing lodging to transient
guests with five or fewer rooms for hire and in which the proprietor occupies as his residence are
excluded from coverage. Id. § 2000a(b)(l).
151. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-21-3 (2015).
152. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 391.099(a)(1)(B) (West 20112015) (defining "eligible
facility" for purposes of the tourist-oriented directional sign program as a facility that complies
with laws relating to the "provision of public accommodation without regard to race, religion,
color, age, sex, or national origin"); see also 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.405(a)(5) (2011)
(conditioning eligibility to have a commercial logo placed on informational signs upon
compliance with "all applicable laws concerning the provision of public accommodations without
regard to race, religion, color, sex, or national origin").
153. See TEX. ALcO. BEv. CODE ANN. § 11.611 (West 20112015).
154. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17(1) (2014).
155. Id. § 97-23-17(2).
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Civil Rights Act twenty-two years later, but they nevertheless remain on
the books.
Alabama, Mississippi and Texas protect religious liberty through
RFRAs. 156 These RFRAs resemble their counterparts in Categories Three
and Four states. Mississippi and Texas' RFRAs adopt the federal standard
of prohibiting governmental actions that "substantially burden" the
exercise of religion) 57 The Mississippi RFRA does not define
"substantial burden." Texas defines the term "substantial burden"
governmental actions that merely
through case law.158 Alabama prohibits
159
burden the free exercise of religion.
All three states define the exercise of religion but do so differently.
Alabama and Mississippi define "exercise" by referencing the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the religious protections provided
in their state constitutions. 160 Texas defines the "free exercise of religion"
as "an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by sincere
religious belief' regardless of whether the act or refusal is central to such
belief.161 However, the parties that may exercise these religious freedoms
remain vague as none of these states define affected "persons" or
expressly extend religious exercise rights to organizations.

The remaining free exercise provisions in these RFRAs are
homogenous. All three RFRAs include rules of general applicability and
facially neutral laws within their scope.' 62 Additionally, all of the RFRAs
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Faith-based objections to the application
of state laws may violate constitutional provisions recognizing and protecting the free exercise of
religion and religious liberty in Georgia and North Carolina. See GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 3-4
(providing that "[e]ach person has the natural and inalienable right to worship God, each
according to the dictates of that person's own conscience; and no human authority should, in any
case, control or interfere with such right of conscience" and further that "[n]o inhabitant of this
state shall be molested in person or property ... on account of religious opinions"); N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 13 ("All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience.").
157. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1(5)(a) (2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
110.003(a) (West 2011).
158. See Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. 2009) (addressing the impact of
a zoning ordinance upon a pre-existing faith-based halfway house for recently released nonviolent
offenders). The Texas Supreme Court required the burden on religion to be "real vs. merely
perceived, and significant vs. trivial." Id. at 301. This determination is to be made on a case-bycase basis and is highly fact-specific. Id. at 302. The challenged governmental action does not
need to be completely prohibitive in order to be substantial. Id. at 305. Rather, a "substantial
burden" exists if "alternatives for the religious exercise are severely restricted." Id.
159. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 V(a).
160. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01(IV)(2) (reference to the Alabama Constitution); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-61-1(4)(c) (2014) (reference to the U.S. Constitution).
161. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § I 10.001(a)(l) (West 2011).
162. See ALA. CONST. art. 1,§ 3.01(II)(2), (V)(a); MISS. CODEANN. § 11-61-1(2)(b), (5)0(a);
TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 1 10.002(c) (West 2011) (stating that the Texas RFRA is
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reference the first prong of the Sherbert test: requiring that a burden upon
the exercise of religion is justified only "in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest,"' 6 3 and that the government utilizes the least
restrictive means by which to further such interest.64 None of the
Category Six RFRAs define the government's evidentiary burden with
respect to these requirements.
II. THE NEED FOR GREATER UNIFORMITY IN PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS LAW

A. The Casefor Greater Uniformity
Public accommodation statutes vary widely in their scope, definitions
of protected classes and prohibited conduct and exclusions. Such statutes
and the public they are designed to serve and protect, as well as the
judiciary entrusted with their interpretation and enforcement, would
benefit from greater uniformity. This is not to propose a uniform statute,
which would be unlikely to garner widespread support, or that states
should not be left to make their own individual determinations. Rather,
the contention is that the law, the public and the judiciary would benefit
from some generally accepted principles with respect to the definitions
of public accommodations, prohibited conduct and exemptions within the
body of the statutes themselves or accompanying RFRAs.
Greater uniformity in the context of defining what accommodations
are truly "public" may minimize future conflicts. A broad definition that
includes all businesses providing goods and services to the general public*
serves the state's compelling interest in guaranteeing public access to the
widest range of establishments including those operated, managed or
funded by the state. Such a definition also properly places the burden of
demonstrating that a particular establishment should not be considered a
public accommodation upon the party advancing the exclusion argument.
The same reasoning is applicable to arguments that a particular
establishment, although public in nature, is subject to a religious
exemption. Once again, the party advancing the argument properly bears
the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the claimed
exemption.' 65 The result would be a uniform approach to resolving
applicable to "each law of this state" unless otherwise expressly exempted without specific
reference to rules of general applicability or facially neutral laws).
163. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01(V)(b)(l); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-61-1(5)(b)(i); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003(bb)(1) (West 2011).

164. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 (V)(b)(2); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-l(5)(b)(ii); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.003(bb)(2).
165. See Lucien J. Dhooge, PublicAccommodation Statutesand Sexual Orientation:Should
There Be a Religious Exemptionfor Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319,
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competing claims of public accommodation, exclusions and exemptions.
Such an approach may also minimize disputes associated with the
granting of religious exemptions. Greater uniformity may lessen
"idiosyncratic coverage exclusions" among states which raise neutrality
concerns when one set of religious beliefs is accommodated through an
exemption but others are not treated similarly. 166 A more uniform
legislative approach may also benefit future courts called upon to mediate
between the right to access and religion. Greater consistency in the
drafting of public accommodation statutes may lessen the possibility of
conflicting judicial outcomes in what will ultimately prove to be a
dilemma incapable of resolution to the satisfaction of all parties. 167
Difficult though it may be, it is a useful exercise to attempt to move the
country forward to some rough degree of national consensus on the
appropriate extent of accommodation to be granted to religion in the
68
public sphere.'

Compromise is essential to reaching this "rough consensus." For
supporters of unlimited public access, there is the need to acknowledge
the value of religion and exercise the "virtue of graciousness" toward
those who remain opposed to greater acceptance of the LGBT community
on religious grounds.169 Conversely, for religious believers, the dialogue
358 (2015) (contending that a blanket exemption for religion "improperly places the burden of
proof on potential customers who have been denied goods or service [and that] ....[t]he burden
of proof of entitlement to any exemption should fall on the potential beneficiary and not the
current victim").
166. See Lund, supra note 15, at 492; see also Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 57 (contending
that "it is not clear that a state is acting neutrally with regard to a religious exemption request that
it excludes from its RFRA when other religious claims are accommodated").
167. See RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 56 (2006) (describing the role of religion as posing the question of whether the
United States should "be a religious nation, collectively committed to values of faith and worship,
but with tolerance for religious minorities including nonbelievers ....[or] a nation committed to
thoroughly secular government but with tolerance and accommodation for people of religious
faith"); see also Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 92 (concluding that "[d]ecisions that fundamental
cannot be made by the [U.S.] Supreme Court, then or now").
168. See Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 105 (predicting the reaching of a "rough consensus"
that will ultimately affect every jurisdiction).
169. See id.at 114 (contending that "[a] perspective of common ground" requires respect
for "traditional religions" and "generosity toward assertions of religious exemption"); see also
Martha C. Nussbaum, A Pleafor Difficulty, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 105, 106
(Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (contending that religion is worthy of value due to "its role in
people's search for the ultimate meaning of life; in consoling people for the deaths of loved ones
and in helping them face their own mortality; in transmitting moral values; in giving people a
sense of community and civic dignity; [and] in giving them imaginative and emotional
fulfillment"); Megan Pearson, Religious Claims vs. Non-DiscriminationRights: Another Pleafor
Difficulty, 15 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 47,50 (2013) (concluding that "[fireedom of religion,
including the protection of individual religious conduct, is . . . a right worthy of significant
protection"); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Opinion, Don't Wreck Religious Liberty's Brand, WASH. POST (Apr.
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must move away from questions of "exclusive truth" and toward
adjustment of views when religion enters the public square. 170 This
includes recognition that discriminatory practices negatively affect
"equal citizenship" which acts as a restraint upon government actions and
occasionally requires government to prevent discrimination by private
parties.' 71 In addition to ensuring equal access to goods and services,
"equal citizenship" implicates other compelling state interests, including
removal of economic, political and social barriers that hinder
advancement of disadvantaged groups and broader civic and economic
participation in society. 172 "Equal citizenship" also implies governmental
dignity, which may be negatively
recognition and protection of17individual
3
impacted by discrimination.

The question is where does the path to compromise lie? Utilizing
provisions of the above-categorized statutes, this Article advocates a
separationist approach to questions arising from the intersection of public
accommodation law and religion. The government must forbear in cases
involving the establishment, internal operation of and participation in
strictly religious institutions. Personal religious freedom exercisedthrough group activity is potentially impaired when the government does
not leave strictly religious institutions alone to make their own
determinations and govern themselves. 174 The institutions also suffer to
the extent they are compelled or coerced into forfeiting or compromising
175
traditional beliefs in order to conform to contemporary social norms.
The secular state must render "unto God the things which be God's" in
1, 2015) (urging supporters of LGBT rights to consider "the virtue of graciousness" toward those
opposed to equality for the good of social peace).
170. Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 114.
171. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1,35 (1977) (contending that "equal citizenship"

.

"implies access to all those activities and places, whether managed directly by government or not,
that are normally open to the public at large"); see also Pearson, supra note 169, at 52.
172. See Sara A. Gelsinger, Comment, Right to Exclude or Forcedto Include? Creating a
Better Balancing Test for Sexual OrientationDiscriminationCases, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155,
1177(2012).
173. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (describing the conferral

of dignity and status upon the LGBT community as of "immense import"); see also Neomi Rao,
Three Concepts of Dignity in ConstitutionalLaw, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 262 (2011)

(defining dignity to include public respect and recognition by the community which validates an
individual's private choices). But see Noa Ben-Asher, ConferringDignity: The Metamorphosis of
the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 277 (2014) (expressing doubt about the

government's authority to grant moral dignity to its citizens and whether such dignity must be
recognized across state boundaries).
174. See, e.g., Leilani N. Fisher, Comment, InstitutionalReligious Exemptions: A Balancing
Approach, 2014 BYU L. REV. 415, 422 (2014) (noting that individual religious exercise often

occurs through group activities).
175. Id.at 423.
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such cases.
That said, religious institutions and persons must "[r]ender ... unto
Caesar the things which be Caesar's."'' 77 These "things" include setting
fair terms for the operation of the marketplace. An outcome that
recognizes the rights of everyone to full and equal participation in the
marketplace free from the harmful effects of discrimination based upon
innate physical characteristics or public perceptions thereof is a fair term.
Thus, in the area of public accommodations, any purported conflict
between religious liberty asserted by for-profit businesses and access to
goods and services must be resolved in favor of the government's
compelling interest in guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory access
for all persons.
B. Defining PublicAccommodations and DiscriminatoryPractices
Greater uniformity starts with the definition of public
accommodations. One possible approach is a broad definition of public
accommodations, which captures all types of commercial and business
activities with narrowly drawn religious exemptions. This approach
provides that public accommodations include any establishment offering
goods or services to the public. Precedent for such a definition may be
found in sixteen existing statutes, which constitute the majority of states
that define public accommodations. 7 8 Allegedly comprehensive lists as
utilized in fourteen states create the risk of omission of types of
businesses and specific establishments and may be cumbersome to read
and interpret.'79 It is far simpler to classify every establishment offering
goods or services to the general public as a public accommodation, unless
proven otherwise or subject to a designated exemption.
States should also resist the temptation to conform their definitions of
public accommodations to those contained within Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.180 Public accommodations in locations as diverse as
Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, and
Texas expressly or implicitly utilize such a definition. 18 1 Although a
historic milestone, the Act is timid by modem standards in its adherence

176. Luke 20:25 (King James).
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 37, 51, 99, 142 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of public
accommodations in Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming).
179. See supra notes 38, 52, 100, 143 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of
public accommodations in Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Washington).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012).
18 1. See supra notes 39, 53, 69, 150 and accompanying text.
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182

to the narrow nineteenth century iteration of covered accommodations.
Additionally, the operations of establishments affecting commerce in183
a
manner sufficient to trigger the Act's protections were circumscribed.
It should pass without argument that the backwards-looking example set
by Mississippi with respect to "public business[es], trade[s]. .
[and]
84
profession[s]" operating within the state should be roundly rejected. 1
Explicit or implicit government-sanctioned discrimination in public
accommodations should also be prohibited by including such facilities
within this broad definition. 8 5 For example, establishments operated or
managed by state and local governments should be deemed public
accommodations. Although far too narrow in its overall definition,
Nebraska's inclusion of facilities owned, operated, or managed by the
86
state or any agency or subdivision thereof is a good starting point. 1
Establishments receiving government funds and subsidies for operations
should also be deemed public accommodations. Such is the case in states
as diverse as Maryland and Iowa. 187 An approach that limits public
accommodations to government-permitted establishments, such as in
South Carolina, is contrary to the
desired outcome of expanding the
88
definition and covered locations. 1

Another area ripe for greater uniformity is the definition of
discriminatory practices. While an explicit refusal to serve a person on
the basis of his or her membership in a protected class is clearly
discriminatory, damages the dignitary interests of the affected individual,
182. See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a
New Age of Consumer Access Rights: CreatingSpace in the PublicAccommodationfor the LGBT
Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 781, 789 (2013) (criticizing Title II for its close

adherence to the "Nineteenth Century Interpretation" of public accommodations); but see RichardA. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of
Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1243-44 (2014) (contending that

Title II of the Civil Rights Act is adequate as drafted):
[T]he worm has unfortunately turned, as people have lost sight of the evils that a
public accommodations law should combat. The new application of the next
generation of human rights law has the exact opposite orientation: may the state
force small and isolated businesses, often with Christian beliefs, to violate their
bona fide religious beliefs in order to provide services in highly competitive
market segments?
Id.
183.

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.

184.

See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.

185.

See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's statute which sanctions

state discrimination in public accommodations by explicitly omitting facilities owned, operated,
or managed by the state or any agency or subdivision thereof).
186.

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

187.

See supra notes 35, 51 and accompanying text.

188.

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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and most likely constitutes a violation of applicable law, it is not the only
means by which discrimination occurs and injury is inflicted.
Discrimination and injury are also apparent in the publication, posting
and circulation of communications that the patronage of certain persons
will be refused or that such persons are unwelcome, a practice which is
expressly prohibited in seventeen states and the District of Columbia.18 9
Although it is unlikely that states without such prohibitions would follow
the lead of Mississippi, which permits the posting of such notifications,
it is nevertheless better practice to recognize that such communications
are a form of discrimination that should be prevented through express
prohibitions.' 9 A combination of multiple state statutes prohibiting the
publication, posting, circulation or other dissemination of any written,
typewritten, mimeographed, printed, visual or electronic notice, sign,
advertisement, statement circular, folder, book, or pamphlet stating that
the patronage of certain persons will be refused or that such persons are
unwelcome, objectionable or undesirable is preferable in this regard.' 9 '
Discriminatory acts may not only be directed at members of a
protected class but also toward persons who associate with or are
perceived to associate with such class members. However, despite the
injury that a person who associates with protected class members may
suffer from a denial of service, only one state, California, specifically
prohibits discrimination against such third persons. 192 The recognition of
such discrimination and inclusion of a prohibition in the statutes of other
states is the better practice and is consistent with broadening the
definitions of public accommodations and discriminatory practices.
Acts of third parties may also result in discrimination and injury to
protected persons. However, complicity in discriminatory acts is
expressly prohibited in only seventeen states and the District of
Columbia.' 93 These statutes prohibit a wide range of behavior from aiding
and abetting to assisting, coercing or compelling discriminatory acts.
Perhaps the best prohibition is that which is the broadest given that all of
the forms of indirect participation may result in injury. Thus, a
combination of various statutes prohibiting actions aiding, abetting,
inciting, inducing, compelling or coercing discriminatory practices by
94
others is preferable. 1
189. See supra notes 44, 55, 72, 144 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
191.

Statutes in Colorado,

Delaware, Louisiana and Massachusetts

are particularly

comprehensive and thus instructive in this regard. See supra notes 44, 55, 72, 144 and
accompanying text.
192.
193.

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43, 54, 73, 145 and accompanying text.

194. This proposed standard is a combination of prohibitions contained in the Nebraska and
North Dakota statutes. See supra notes 54, 145 and accompanying text.
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Greater uniformity could be advantageous in those states extending
anti-discrimination protection in public accommodations to the LGBT
community. Those states that have added sexual orientation to their
definitions of protected classes have been uniform with respect to
inclusion of heterosexuality, homosexuality and bisexuality.' 95 Gaps
exist however with respect to discriminatory actions based upon
perceived orientation where two states may lack coverage 196 and in
gender identity which is included in only twelve statutes.' 97 While the
impact of recent developments with respect to LGBT rights on public
accommodation statutes remains to be determined, those states choosing
to extend protection on the basis of sexual orientation would be wellserved to revisit their statutes and determine if amendment is desirable.
C. Defining and GrantingReligious Exemptions
Minimizing future conflicts also requires greater uniformity with
respect to defining and granting religious exemptions. A starting point in
this regard is addressing the "famously intractable task" of defining.
religion.' 98 Despite this alleged difficulty, such a definition is necessary'
for at least two reasons. First, it is necessary to define religion if its
exercise is to be granted exemptions from the operation of the law in
certain circumstances. Every objection, moral or otherwise, becomes the
exercise of religion without some general parameters. Religion cannot
simply be "any set of answers to religious questions, including the
negative and skeptical answers of atheists, agnostics, and secularists" in
this context without the definition swallowing the law from which it seeks
an exemption. 199 Closely related to this issue is the need to ensure.
which, every objection becomes
sincerity of belief, once again without
200
religious and subject to shielding.
195. See supra notes 40-41, 48 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of explicit protection
on the basis of perceived orientation in Delaware and Vermont).
197. See supra notes 42, 49 and accompanying text.
198. Mark L. Rienzi, The Casefor Religious Exemptions - Whether Religion is Special or
Not, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (2014) (book review).
199. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 326

(1996).
200.

See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex MarriageDebates,

89 IND. L.J. 703, 757 (2014) (contending that exemptions such as medical conscience legislation
encourages those without strong moral or religious objections to refuse service due to the absence
of a sincerity of belief requirement); see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought?
An Interpretive Guide to the Religious FreedomRestorationAct, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 41-43 (1994)

(contending that "[tihe threat of cumulative exemptions comes not only from other sincere
religious objectors, but from other persons who could feign the same objection to get the benefits
of exemption"). But see Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W.

RES. L. REV. 55, 132-33 (2006) (contending that sham claims would be discouraged by a
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Despite its intractability, commentators and courts have reached
similar conclusions in their definitional efforts. For example, Leiter
identifies three characteristics of all religions, specifically, categorical
adherence to specific teachings irrespective of internal desires and
outside demands; insulation for "ordinary standards of evidence and
rational justification;" and "existential consolation" to believers coping
with the challenges presented by life. 20 1 Similarly, courts have described
religion as comprehensive belief systems dictating adherents' conduct
and addressing "fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with
deep and imponderable matters." 20 2 These traits are not exclusive of any
20 3
one religion but are a shared "family resemblance" across all religions.
As a result, courts "almost never have20 4any difficulty in determining
whether something is a religion or not.",
Two public accommodation statutes defining religion and its exercise
track these broad definitions. The District of Columbia's ordinance
focuses upon belief and worship of "a divine ruling power" or
"supernatural power" which controls individual destiny as well as
devotion, fidelity, faithfulness, conscientiousness, or affection for
principles associated with such belief and worship. 20 5 Kansas further
requires that beliefs be sincerely-held and exercised by acts or refusals to
act substantially motivated by such beliefs regardless of their compulsory
nature or centrality to the religion in question. 20 6 Other legislative efforts
to define religion and its exercise fail to adequately address aspects of
religious belief or require sincerity in its exercise. 20 7 The definitions
combination of "common sense costs," lack of seriousness of purpose, the risk of ill will directed
at those asserting such claims, and the absence of material advantages associated with the receipt
of an exemption).
201. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 34, 52 (2013).
202. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).
203.

ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 128 (2013).

204. Id. at 7. But see Joshua Bauers, The Price of Citizenship: An Analysis of AntiDiscriminationLaws andReligious Freedoms in Elane Photograph,LLC v. Willock, 15 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 588, 602 (2014) (stating that "[tihe government is not permitted to regulate what
constitutes 'practicing' a particular religion just as it will not validate or invalidate any particular
religious belief'). However, courts have not shied away from examining beliefs in order to
determine whether an application of the law particular to religion was justified. See, e.g., Knight
v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 199-200, 205 (1989) (examining the ecclesiastical functions of a licentiate of
the Presbyterian Church in order to determine if he was a minister within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code); Silverman v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 727, 732 (1972) (examining the
ecclesiastical functions of a cantor of the Jewish faith in order to determine if he was a minister
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code); Salkov v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 190, 197 (1966)
(examining the ecclesiastical functions of a cantor of the Jewish faith in order to determine if he
was a minister within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code).
205. D.C. CODE § 46-406 (20142014).
206.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302 (2015).

207. For example, New York's effort to define religion is woefully short as it merely
references "divine worship" without expanding further upon the beliefs underlying such worship
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contained within the District of Columbia ordinance and Kansas RFRA
offer religious beliefs broad protection without requiring extensive
government intrusion into matters of faith while simultaneously ensuring
that their practice, which may qualify for an exemption, is sincere,
properly motivated and not intended solely as an attempt to avoid legal
obligations. Such a result is consistent with constitutional principles
encouraging absolute protection for religious beliefs but recognizing
limitations upon their practice when they conflict with laws adopted to
meet a compelling state interest.
Any definition of religion should be accompanied by a definition of
religious facilities. Facilities devoted exclusively to religious purposes
should be protected from the reach of public accommodations statutes to
the same extent as the exercise of faith occurring therein. The small
number of public accommodation statutes that have addressed this issue
are for the most part overbroad and unworkably vague. Exclusions or
exemptions granted to places of worship such as churches, mosques, and
synagogues present easy cases. However, Colorado's statute for example
20 8
extends to other locations "principally used for religious purposes."
The statute thus seems to require a determination and comparison of the
percentages of usage for religious and non-religious purposes. It is
unclear whether the requirement of "principal" usage means a scant
majority or larger amount of usage nor whether this determination is
based upon the number of events, the amount of time associated with each
event, or some other measure. Similarly, Oregon's statute includes
facilities "closely connected with or related to the primary purposes" of
a religious organization without further elaboration upon the meanings of
"close connections" or "relations." 209 Other statutes appear to suffer from
overbreadth by granting blanket exemptions to facilities associated with
or operated, supervised or controlled by a religious organization,
association or society.210
A preferable approach is to separate facilities strictly utilized for
religious purposes from those more closely associated with secular
activities. Illinois' statute provides some guidance in this regard through
its exclusion of "facilities such as businesses" from its religious
exemption. 211 It may be presumed that this omission is applicable to
and seems to require attendance at meetings or services in order to be deemed religious. See supra
note 32 and accompanying text. Illinois' and New Mexico's statutes do not require purported
exercises of religion be motivated by sincerely-held beliefs. See supra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text.
208. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2015). See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
209. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.006(3) (2014). See also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing exemptions in Connecticut and
Rhode Island).
211. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/209 (2015).
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facilities owned or operated by religious organizations, associations or
societies and affiliated organizations which are otherwise made available
to members of the general public without faith-based distinctions and on
a for-profit basis. Unfortunately, the Illinois statute does not elaborate
upon this omission. However, guidance in drafting a uniform provision
separating religious and secular facilities may be found in the Minnesota
and Oregon statutes. Minnesota' statute expressly excludes secular
business activities from its religious facilities exemption. 212 Oregon's
statute is even more explicit in its exclusion of facilities connected with
commercial or business activities of religious organizations. 213 Oregon's
exclusion appears broader due to its requirement that the commercial or
business activity in question have no necessary relationship to the
religious purposes of the organization, whereas Minnesota requires the
activity to be wholly unrelated to the purposes for which the religious
association was organized. 1 4 This difference in language is important as
an association's commercial activity loosely related to the purposes for
which it was formed may be sufficient to include the activity within
Minnesota's religious facilities exemption. This same activity most likely
would not qualify as exempt pursuant to Oregon's statute as it was not
necessary to the religious purposes of the organization. Oregon's
approach is preferable as it recognizes the extraordinary nature of
exemptions by narrowing them to those which are necessary to the
fulfillment of the missions of religious organizations.
Defining religion and religious facilities does not alter exemptions
granted to religious personnel, the so-called "ministerial exemption."
Numerous state statutes, including all of those that recognize same-sex
marriage legislatively, contain exemptions for clergy with respect to
solemnization of marriages in contravention of the teachings of their
respective religious orders.2" 5 These statutes vary slightly with respect to
their wording but, as a general matter, permit individuals of any religious
association, organization or society who are authorized to solemnize or
celebrate marriages to refuse to do so on religious grounds. Any
variations among definitions is easily resolvable if the applicable statutes
made reference to the definition contained in the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code as does the Connecticut statute.21 6 The definition is largely
212. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
213.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

214. See supra notes 36, 58 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 27, 113 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1 402(c)-5(a) (as
amended by T.D. 6978, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,937 (Oct. 30, 1968)) (requiring an individual to be a

"duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church" in order to qualify for special
tax provisions available to the ministry). The regulation is disjunctive and intended to deny
benefits to self-appointed ministers rather than limit benefits accruing to the ordained. See Salkov,
46 T.C. at 197. Services performed by clergy in the exercise of his or her ministry include
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irrelevant in any event due to the absence of any genuine legal dispute
with regard to forcing clergy to officiate at weddings of which their
or requiring purely religious facilities to
respective religions disapprove
21 7
accommodate such weddings.
A separation of secular and religious beliefs and activities is crucial to
drawing distinctions between the public and private realms. 2 18 Public
institutions provide "socially important goods and services, including
commercial goods and services, directly to both religious and nonreligious individuals" in an inclusive manner. 21 9 As noted by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent in Hobby Lobby, public institutions such as forprofit corporations do not exist to "foster the interests of persons
subscribing to the same religious faith" nor do they "exist to serve a
community of believers." 220 By contrast, private institutions are selfsustaining, function without government aid or interaction with outsiders,
and serve the interests of select groups of individuals. 22 1 Religious
organizations functioning as private institutions are entitled to greater
which includes greater freedom from generally
degree of self-autonomy
222
applicable laws.
Religious organizations acting in the manner of public institutions
have chosen to enmesh themselves in the secular world and thus
surrender some degree of self-governance. 223 The autonomy argument
performance of sacerdotal functions, the conduct of religious worship, the control, conduct and
maintenance of religious organizations, and the performance of teaching and administrative duties
at theological seminaries. See Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1 (as amended by T.D. 6691, 28 Fed. Reg..
12,817 (Dec. 3, 1963)); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5 (as amended by T.D. 6978, 33 Fed.

Reg. 15,937 (Oct. 30, 1968)).
217.

See Sepper, supra note 200, at 713 (contending that "no genuine legal dispute" exists

as "[in no instance would legalization of same-sex marriage force clergy to officiate weddings of
which their religion disapproves or require houses of worship to open their doors to such
weddings"); see also Marc D. Stem, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 1 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds.,

20082008) (stating that "[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even asked, to
perform marriages that are anathema to them").
218. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious
Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 274, 280-82 (2010) (contending that distinctions between the

public and private realms is useful in separating meritorious religious exemptions from
unmeritorious exemptions).
219.
220.

See Fisher, supra note 174, at 432.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2795-96 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting).
221.
222.

Fisher, supra note 174, at 433.
Id.

223. Id.at 433 (contending that self-governance is eroded when a religious organization
"forgoes life on an island in order to interact with outsiders ...[and] invites the public into its
sphere"). See also LESLIE A. CAROTHERS, THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW OF 1964:
ARGUMENTS, ISSUES AND ATTITUDES INA LEGAL DEBATE 1 I (1968) (stating that businesses are
legitimately subject to regulation as they operate in the public realm and that "when a man chooses
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underlying exemptions granted to religious organizations under ordinary

circumstances are weakened when the organization acts as "a very
22 4
inclusive commercial institution that opens its doors to the public."

Self-governance whereby religious believers and their communities
unilaterally make decisions regarding the provision of goods and services

cannot be fully indulged in such circumstances. 225 Such organizations
thus have a diminished entitlement to and most likely diminished
expectation of exemptions.2 2 6 This is the price of doing business.22 7 To

conclude otherwise inadvisably injects morality determinations into the
public accommodation arena, an area which operates free from moral
judgments by separating issues of discrimination from moral or social
acceptance.22 8 The injection of morality into the marketplace in such
to go into business ....
he loses part of his freedom of action because his capacity to injure others
has increased").
224. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,314 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (stating that
"[tihe more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it" (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)). See also Fisher, supra note
174174, at 438.
225. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 103-04 (noting that "the logic of a separate
religious realm cannot work in a modem society. . . . [and that] [t]he religious believer and the
religious community cannot be left alone to decide about religious exemptions"); Sepper, supra
note 200, at 719 (stating that "commercial transactions of a business, despite any perceived
religious mission, bring it within the rubric of a public accommodation subject to
antidiscrimination laws").
226. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that "[wihen followers of
a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on
their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory
schemes which are binding on others in that activity").
227. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 284 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (stating that "one who employ[s] his private property for purposes of commercial
gain by offering goods or services to the public must stick to his bargain"); see also Chai R.
Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 119
(2006) (stating that "[olnce individuals choose to enter the stream of economic commerce by
opening commercial establishments, I believe it is legitimate to require that they play by certain
rules"); Garrett Epps, What Makes Indiana'sReligious-FreedomLaw Different?, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.the atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianasreligious-freedom-law-different/388997/ (concluding that "[b]eing required to serve those we
dislike is a painful price to pay for the privilege of running a business").
228. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (concluding that "if the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest" (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see also Dhooge, supra
note 165, at 364 (stating that "[p]ermitting religious carve-outs injects individuals, businesses and
governments into a polarizing and unnecessary debate by equating equal treatment with moral
acceptance"); Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 105 (stating that "the extension of political differences
into commercial conduct is not something to be celebrated"); Pearson, supra note 169, at 59
(contending that not all accommodation of the.LGBT community is morally culpable due to the
absence of proximity in time and place or relative insignificance of the act); Sepper, supra note
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circumstances invites "'conscience creep' in which all resistance to
regulation becomes229acceptable ....[and] every citizen ...become[s] a
law unto himself."
Blurring differences between public and private institutions is further
harmful to the extent it facilitates discrimination resulting in a denial of
goods and services. Such facilitation places the existing antidiscrimination framework at risk.230 Blurring also trivializes professions
200, at 743 (contending that "virtually all objections" to accommodation of the LGBT community
by businesses in the coniext of same-sex marriage "founder on the requirements of causal and
proximate responsibility"). But see Jennifer Ann Abodeely, Comment, Thou Shall Not
Discriminate:A Proposalfor Limiting FirstAmendment Defenses to Discriminationin Public
Accommodations, 12 SAINT MARY'S L. REV. MINORITY ISSUES 585, 601 (2010) (discussing the

view of Christian advocacy groups that "any legislation benefitting LGBT people as a class stands
in direct conflict with others' right to freely exercise their religion" and that "[slince these groups'
interpretation of religious text informs them that homosexuality is immoral, they believe that,
based on their religious beliefs, they should be able to refuse service, medical treatment,
employment, and other accommodations to LGBT people"); BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND STATE ANTI-DSCRIMINATION LAWS 2 (2009) (contending.

that any facilitation of same-sex marriages by religious objectors is a violation of conscience and
thus exempts such objectors from hiring persons in same-sex marriages, extending benefits to
same-sex spouses, making "property or services available for same-sex marriage ceremonies" and
providing housing to same-sex couples).
229. Sepper, supra note 200, at 741. See also W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the
Scope of Free Exercise Protection,32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665,676-77 (1999) (cautioning against
excessive religious freedom claims because if such claims "sweep too broadly, it is virtually
impossible to avoid situations where most reasonable people would agree that secular concerns
trump arguably religious claims" and that there are "many situations where it is reasonable to
expect religious groups to respect and be willing to accommodate the needs of surrounding
society"). Professor Brownstein summarized the need for acceptance of some limitations upon
free exercise as follows:
Broadly defined rights cannot always receive rigorous protection because doing
so would unreasonably interfere with the government's ability to further the
public good. No democratic society will surrender its power to pursue interests
that conflict with rights so completely and irrevocably. Insistence on a rigid
commitment to rigorous review risks an obvious response: the scope of the right
will be limited to only those situations in which it does not conflict with any
interests the society values or cares about.
Brownstein, supra note 200, at 82.
230. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual OrientationDiscrimination,100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169,
1231 (2012) (arguing that "the application of the religious exemption to secular actors in the
stream of commerce threatens to cut back existing antidiscrimination protections in a much more
sweeping fashion"); see also Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Callfor Exemptions for Those Who
DiscriminateAgainst Marriedor MarryingGays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 180
(2012) (contending that the facilitation of discrimination against the LGBT community in public
accommodations on the basis of religious liberty undermines not only public accommodation
statutes but other antidiscrimination laws which have enhanced "equality" and "practical liberty").
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and acts of faith engaged in for truly spiritual purposes by equating such
in solely out of bigotry and transparently
acts with those engaged
23 1
discriminatory motives.
There are several other equally important reasons for adopting this
approach in public accommodation law. Blurring the distinction between
public and private institutions creates the risk that broad and ill-conceived
religious exemptions with potentially deleterious consequences become
a permanent part of the legal landscape. 232 Religious exemptions have the
231. See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 230, at 1196, 1200. NeJaime describes religious
opposition to marriage equality as follows:
Marriage equality represents merely one instantiation of relationship-based
sexual orientation equality. And objections to marriage equality serve largely as
a subset of broader religious objections to sexual orientation equality ....
Religious objections are rooted most often not in marriage alone, but in the
facilitation and recognition of same-sex relationships. In other words, the
objection animating opposition to same-sex marriage relates primarily to the
enactment of sexual orientation itself rather than the form such enactment takes.
Id.See also Dhooge, supra note 165, at 363 (contending that "[ejither exemptions are intended to
apply to all religious beliefs, thereby permitting discrimination under any circumstance in which
such beliefs are offended, or they are limited to homosexuality, thereby expressing an underlying
purpose opposed to gay equality and liberty rather than for the purpose of securing religious
freedom"); James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracialand Same-Sex Marriages,50 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 99, 145-46 (2015) (contending that persons seeking religious exemptions with respect to
same-sex marriage are motivated by anti-LGBT animus as "no state has ever exempted
commercial business owners from the obligation to provide equal services for interracial
marriages, interfaith marriages, or marriages involving divorced individuals - even though major
religious traditions in America have opposed each type of marriage"); Frank Bruni, Opinion, Your
God and My Dignity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
01/I I/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-religious-liberty-bigotry-and-gays.html (questioning the stated
motives of those claiming that serving members of the LGBT community violates their religious
freedom by noting that such persons are "routinely interacting with customers who behave in
ways they deem sinful"); Stephen Stromberg, Yes, Indiana's 'religious freedom' law could
promote discrimination, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/03/30/yes-indianas-religious-freedom-law-couldpromote-discrimination (questioning the stated intent of the Indiana RFRA on the basis of its
potential to entrench legal discrimination against the LGBT community).
232. See Lund, supra note 15, at 494-95 (recognizing the possibility that state governments
cannot or will not eliminate or narrow previously-granted religious exemptions for political
reasons or because any such modifications may not be deemed neutral or generally applicable);
see also Sepper, supra note 200, at 756 (questioning the assumption that exemptions would be
repealed even if the public no longer supports them and acceptance of the LGBT community
grows). But see Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and PublicAccommodations:
An EmpiricalApproach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1804
(2012) (contending that religious exemptions would undergo "incremental narrowing.. . as time
goes on and public or legal opinion shifts"); Rienzi, supra note 198, at 1415 (stating that "[ijf a
time arrives when [religious] exemptions do threaten the common good, presumably legislatures
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potential to cause harm to the LGBT community, a community that has
been subjected to a historic pattern of widespread, pervasive and
purposeful discrimination and unequal treatment at the federal and state

levels.233 In a related vein, adding moral objections in the form of a
religious exemption to generally applicable statutes such as those relating
to public accommodations imposes unnecessary financial and time costs
as well as significant dignitary and psychological damage on the targeted
community.2 3 4 Discrimination in public accommodations is also contrary
to "the cherished American ideals of justice and equality under the

law." 235 Limitations upon the parties eligible for an exemption, such as
small businesses,

2 36

or based upon the type of goods or service at issue

will no longer offer them").
233. At the federal level, the LGBT community is protected by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36. However, sexual orientation is not
included as a protected class in numerous federal anti-discrimination statutes. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1691-1691f (2012) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (201219) (Fair
Housing Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000e-2(a) (2012) (Civil Rights Act of 1964). At the state
level, only thirty-one states extended private or public employment protection to the LGBT
community at the time of the preparation of this article. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Discrimination also was not prohibited by the common law which adopted the view that
businesses had "an absolute right to choose their customers and to exclude anyone from their
businesses for any reason unless limited by a civil rights statute [or other law such as those
applicable to innkeepers and common carriers]." Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:
PublicAccommodations and Private Property,90 Nw. U.L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996).
234. See Sepper, supra note 200, at 759 (discussing potential burdens placed upon the LGBT
community as a result of religious exemptions to public accommodations statutes including
additional time and money spent locating substitute providers of goods and services, dignitary
and psychological damage associated with scrutiny that is not normally a part of a commercial
transaction, and loss of trust in public and private institutions); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (in which the Court concluded discrimination is harmful to society by
depriving it of "the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life"). These
burdens and harms may be exacerbated given limitations upon judicial inquiry into the actions of
religious institutions and individuals. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 429 (stating that "[wihereas
courts are allowed to scrupulously analyze the mistakes of tortfeasors in ordinary discrimination
or malpractice situations, institutional exemptions preclude judicial inquiry into the wrongdoing
of religious groups in certain areas of law"). But see Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience
or Indignity? Religious Exemptions to Public Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 705, 707
(2014) (describing the burdens and damages to the LGBT community as a "mere inconvenience
and mild sense of offense").
235. Abodeely, supra note 228, at 600; see also Curtis, supra note 230, at 184-92
(analogizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation with race and gender discrimination
as group membership is based upon unalterable biological factors, each group has a long history
of persecution and discrimination in employment, housing, access to health care, family issues
(such as marriage and adoption) and public accommodations which persecution often had roots
in religious beliefs, and each group suffered economic and dignitary harms).
236. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims
Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 206,227 (2010) (contending that "[s]mall businesses
that provide personal services tend to be direct embodiments of the owner's identity"); Chapman,
supra note 232, at 1810 (stating that "[o]nce an entity reaches a critical mass, the justification for
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are unworkable. 237 Rather, the government has compelling interests in the
protection of human dignity and equal exercise of the rights of citizenship
through prohibitions upon discrimination, including guaranteeing access
to public establishments. 238 Religious exemptions from legal
requirements for public institutions sends a message contrary to these
interests.239

an owner's feeling that his or her religious freedoms have been infringed upon through a personal
identification with his or her business, or through in-person interactions with same-sex
individuals, becomes less credible"). But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2797 n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (noting that small businesses may in fact be
quite large with sizable revenue and numbers of employees, that the reasoning of the majority
opinion extends free exercise rights to "corporations of any size, public or private" and that the
majority's assurance that it is "improbable" that large publicly traded companies will avail
themselves of their free exercise rights is speculative); see also Oleske, supra note 23 1, at 138
(noting that there are approximately 3.6 million businesses in the United States consisting of four
or fewer employees).
237. One such proposed limitation is for vital services. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 232,
at 1815 (proposing a religious exemption except in cases involving "the health, life, or material
pecuniary interest of an individual"). But see Dhooge, supranote 165, at 356-57 (contending that
a "vital services" limitation is unworkable due to likely omissions and lack of specificity in
identifying providers and the diverse range of services identified by state laws as "vital"). Another
often-proposed limitation is based upon hardship and provides that a business would be permitted
to refuse service on the basis of sexual orientation unless it was the only one capable of providing
the good or service in question and the burden upon the potential customer would be heavy. See,
e.g., Berg, supra note 236, at 208. But see Chapman, supra note 232, at 1814-15 (criticizing
proposed hardship limitations as requiring burdensome cataloguing of competitors and market
entries and exits and unfair in depriving business owners of their religious rights "because he or
she happens to have the only business of its type in town"). See also Dhooge, supra note 165, at
358 (criticizing hardship limitations as improperly placing the burden of proof with respect to the
application of an exemption on potential customers); Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or FalseAlarm:
Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal MarriageStatutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding
of the Public Marketplace, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 236, 238 (2010) (noting that "in a clash
between a seller's asserted rights or beliefs and her provision of services to a willing buyer, the
burden should fall on the seller who has placed herself in the public marketplace").
238. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626, 628 (stating that public accommodation laws reflect "the
importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic
advancement and political and social integration that have historically plagued certain
disadvantaged groups" and further noting that these interests are compelling); see also
Muehlmeyer, supranote 182, at 785 (contending that equal access to public establishments brings
"individuals into central social dynamics that are a part of citizenship"); Nan D. Hunter,
Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1634
(200 1) (contending that citizenship "is not purely a creature of the state .... Implicitly, the law
has recognized that markets have a role in constituting citizenship ....[P]ublic accommodation
laws constitute one example of that acknowledgement"); Lauren J. Rosenblum, Equal Access or
Free Speech: The Constitutionality of Public Accommodation Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243,
1243 (1997) (describing the underlying purpose of public accommodation statutes as "ensurling]
that all members of society have equal access to goods and services").
239. See Curtis, supra note 230, at 202-03 (stating that "[t]he message sent by allowing
religious exemptions is that discrimination is wrong and illegal except when it is right and legal").
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D. The RFRA Debate
Related to the question of defining and granting religious exemptions
to public accommodations statutes is the necessity and scope of RFRAs.
Such legislation is based upon the assumption that there is a credible
threat to religious liberty which must be addressed through adoption of
heightened protections. RFRA supporters claim that the expansion of
protected classes and places in public accommodation statutes have
created "an environment of potentially widespread First Amendment
violations" by exceeding the narrow historical purpose of public
accommodation law as expressed in its common law origins, specifically,
guaranteeing access to "quasi-public" services such as inns, restaurants,
and common carriers. 240 This expansion presents an imminent threat to
religious liberty through actual or threatened litigation to enforce equal
access which may violate religious principles. Those individuals and
institutions seeking to uphold religious principles will have no choice but
to expend time and money in their defense or compromise their beliefs. 4 '
Increasing societal acceptance of the LGBT community as evidenced by
the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected class in an increasing
number of public accommodation statutes is of particular concern in this
regard due to the widespread condemnation of homosexuality in religious
teachings.

242

Assuming the existence of a threat posed by public accommodation
statutes in general and the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected
class in particular, RFRAs have proven to be an ineffective method by
which to protect religious liberty.243 RFRA claims are rare and, to the
240. Susan Nabet, Note, ForSale: The Threat of State Public Accommodation Laws to the
First Amendment Rights ofArtistic Businesses, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515, 1515-16 (2012); see also

supra note 150 and accompanying text.
241. See Roger Severino, Or For Poorer: How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious
Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 939, 979 (2007); see also Andrew Koppelman, You Can't
Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious

Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 134 (2006) (contending that "[aintigay discrimination is now
sufficiently stigmatized that a business that openly discriminates is likely to pay an economic
price for doing so"). But see Chapman, supra note 232, at 1820-21 (stating that "market

participants that are focused on the bottom line... may overlook their personal prejudices against
employees, business owners, and customers if they can assist in maximizing profits").
242. See, e.g., J. Brady Brammer, Comment, Religious Groups and the Gay Rights
Movement: Recognizing Common Ground, 2006 BYU L. REV. 995, 1004 (2006) (contending that

changing social attitudes towards the LGBT community and concomitant increasing legal
protections will have the effect of placing religious practices and speech in the "societal closet").
But see Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO

L. REV. 565, 566 (1999) (contending that conflicts between religious liberty and public
accommodation statutes are generally fact-specific rather than broad-based attacks upon free
exercise).
243.

See Lund, supra note 15, at 468 (concluding that RFRAs "simply have not translated
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extent they are filed, are largely unsuccessful due to the absence of a
substantial burden upon free exercise or the presence of a compelling
governmental interest. 24 4 The absence of widespread threats to free

exercise and the resultant dearth of claims have led some commentators
to conclude that the true purpose underlying their continued enactment is
an objection to the increased secularization of society. 245 The increased
focus on RFRAs, especially in those states where sexual orientation is not
deemed a protected class and in anticipation of the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, reinforces the conclusion that RFRAs
246
are a cover for continued and future sexual orientation discrimination.
In transforming religious liberty claims into a rationale for
discrimination, RFRA proponents have weakened their own cause in the
eyes of the general public.247
Assuming the necessity for the widespread adoption of RFRAs, there
remains an issue regarding what form they should take. Unfortunately,
existing RFRAs are divergent with many suffering from overbreadth and
vagueness. Just as with respect to the separation of religious exercise and
business practices discussed above, RFRAs and those impacted by their
adoption and enforcement would benefit from greater uniformity. Greater
uniformity would be particularly beneficial in several discreet areas.
First, existing RFRAs should define religion. Defining religion makes
legislative sense as it is essential to clearly establish that freedom which
RFRAs purport to "restore." A closely related issue is the need to ensure
sincerity of belief without which every objection potentially becomes
religious and the basis for a challenge to state and local laws. 248 The
into a dependable source of protection for religious liberty at the state level").
244. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 75-76 (describing RFRA claims as "exceedingly
rare," "rarely successful" and failing to play "the full role of protecting religious exemption claims
that their drafters expected and hoped for"); Lund, supra note 15, at 479 (contending that there is
"reason to doubt that state RFRAs provide meaningful protection for religious observance" given
the almost complete absence of litigated claims).
245. See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 153, 157 (2000)
(contending that RFRAs do not "solve any actual, recognized problem of discrimination or burden
on religious conduct. . . .[but were adopted] to institute a global protection of religiously
motivated conduct whenever it conflicts with government regulation"); Claire McCusker,
Comment, When Church and State Collide: Averting Democratic Disaffection in a Post-Smith
World, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 391, 398 (2007) (noting that "traditionally religious individuals
are more likely to find their religious practices in conflict with facially neutral laws than they
would have a century ago when traditional religious moral notions were more widespread").
246. See generallysupra notes 74-95, 119-38, 156-64 (discussing RFRAs in states that do
not include sexual orientation as a protected class in their public accommodation statutes).
247. See Dionne, supra note 169 (concluding that "[b]y taking reasonable religious-liberty
claims and then pushing and twisting them into a rationale for discrimination, opponents of gay
marriage have picked a fight that will weaken religious-liberty arguments overall").
248. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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definition should track that previously proposed with respect to granting
exemptions to public accommodation statutes. 249 For the reasons
previously 25
noted,
the definition of religion set forth in Kansas' RFRA is
0
preferable.

Closely related to defining religion is providing greater clarity with
respect to persons subject to RFRA protection. Once again, Kansas'
RFRA provides the best guidance in this regard through its explicit
reference to "any legal person or entity" existing under federal or state
law

which

explicitly

includes

for-profit

organizations. 251

South

Carolina's RFRA defining "person" to include "an individual,
corporation, firm, partnership, association, or organization" is also
satisfactory if not as all-encompassing as Kansas' definition of protected
persons. 252 Louisiana and Pennsylvania's RFRAs are inadequate to the
extent that their protections are limited to individuals and churches,
associations of churches, and other religious orders, bodies, or
institutions.2 3 The confusing distinctions between "persons" and
"providers" in Indiana's RFRA is perhaps a product of the haste in which
it was amended after the nationwide uproar regarding its adoption. 254 The
remaining RFRAs fall short by failing to define persons who may
exercise religion, which leaves their application to for-profit
organizations unclear.255 Granted, courts in these states may choose to
follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. and extend such rights to close corporations at the very least, 256 but
greater specificity in the statutes themselves is a better approach.
A second area in need of greater clarity is the burden that may be
placed upon the exercise of religion by state and local governments.
Fourteen RFRAs utilize the "substantial burden" standard.2 57 The
burdens which may be placed upon the exercise of religion by
governments in Alabama, Connecticut, Kansas, and Missouri remain
unclear given the uncertainty of whether reference to "burdens" in these
statutes means "substantial burdens" or were explicitly intended to
broaden free exercise rights. 258 The lack of expressed legislative intent in
this regard creates uncertainty for governments, individuals, and
businesses and serves as a potential basis for future litigation. These
RFRAs are also overbroad to the extent that they were intended to
249.

See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.

250.

See supra note 206 and accompanying text.

251.

See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(f) (2015).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

S.C. CODEANN. § 1-32-20(3) (2015).
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 129, 160-61 and accompanying text.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
See supra notes 75, 119, 157 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76, 121-23, 159 and accompanying text.
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prohibit any governmental burden on religious exercise. It is not hard to
imagine that any statute or regulation, be it in the fields of public
accommodation, contracts, employment, health care, licensing, or
zoning, may have an impact upon the exercise of one or more religious
beliefs. To make such impacts, no matter how incidental or tangential,
the basis for striking down otherwise neutral laws hobbles the ability of
the government to fulfill its obligation to act in the public interest and
grants religious belief a preferred position with respect to and veto power
over existing and future legislation and regulation.
Even broader and thus more problematic are New Mexico and Rhode
Island's prohibitions upon governmental action that "restricts" free
exercise. 259 Neither of these RFRAs defines impermissible restrictions
thereby creating the possibility that any constraints or limitations no
matter how slight or trivial could serve as a basis for invalidating a state
statute or regulation. Indiana's RFRA is perhaps most problematic of all
as it not only prohibits substantial burdens upon free exercise but also
statutes and regulations that may potentially impose such burdens. 260 In
so doing, litigants challenging state law would not need to demonstrate
actual injury but only the possibility of injury. The utilization of this
standard leaves unclear the degree to which the potential for injury must
exist. Specifically, does a prospective challenger have to demonstrate a
hypothetical potential for injury, a likelihood of injury, or some other
standard? In any circumstance, Indiana's RFRA creates an inadvisably
low burden for challengers. As previously stated, any law may have an
impact upon the free exercise of religion. It takes even less creativity to
conceive of potential impacts of legal obligations upon religious exercise
regardless of whether such impacts and resultant injury have actually
occurred.
Given these shortcomings, the better approach is utilization of the
federal standard of "substantial burden" as adopted by two-thirds of the
existing RFRAs. 261' This standard could be further improved through a
uniform definition of "substantial burden." Only eight RFRAs purport2 to
62
define burdens that impermissibly infringe upon free exercise.
Presumably the remaining statutes adopt the definition as determined by
U.S. courts in interpreting the federal RFRA. Nevertheless, it would be
beneficial to all affected individuals, organizations, governments, and
courts if the substantial burden standard was legislatively established
rather than subject to judicial guesswork as is the case in those states
without a definition.
Pennsylvania's RFRA provides the most explicit and reasonable
259.
260.

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

26 1. See supra notes 75, 119, and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 79-82, 120, and accompanying text.
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statement of "substantially burden" among the existing RFRAs that
contain a definition. "Substantially burden" under Pennsylvania law
balances the interests of the government in fulfilling its obligation to act
in the public interest and equal application of the law with the necessary
respect due to religious beliefs and worship. Thus, conduct mandated by
a sincerely-held religious belief is substantially burdened if it is
significantly constrained or inhibited by government action. 263 An
expression of adherence to a particular religious faith is substantially
burdened if it is significantly curtailed by government action. 264 Other
types of religious expression and conduct are substantially burdened if
the government compels conduct or expressions in violation of specific
tenets of one's religious beliefs, or denies an individual a reasonable
265
opportunity to engage in activities fundamental to one's religious faith.
Prohibitions upon government action in these circumstances is not
modified by the adjective "significant" and thus reflect greater respect for
specific religious activities and beliefs, and less governmental latitude in
these areas.26 6 However, religious activities and expressions must be
fundamental to an individual's religion or in violation of a specific tenet
of one's religious beliefs. Fundamentality and specificity ensure that
purported violations be predicated upon something other than trivial,
technical, or de minimis infractions.
The remaining legislative definitions of "substantial burden" fail to
attain the optimal balance present in the Pennsylvania RFRA. The
RFRAs in Idaho, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia unduly favor
religion by defining substantial burdens as those that in any manner
inhibit or curtail religiously motivated practices without consideration of
the significance or reasonableness of the purported burden.267 Similarly,
Arizona's exclusion of "trivial, technical or de minimis infractions" from
its definition invites judicial entanglement with religion as courts attempt
to separate substantive violations from trivial infractions. 268 It also creates
the impression, most likely unintentional, that all non-trivial or technical
interferences are violations of Arizona's RFRA.
RFRAs would also benefit from greater clarity with respect to their
263. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963) (holding that religiously-motivated acts, as contrasted with beliefs, are "not totally
free from legislative restrictions").
264. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
265. Id.
266. Id. See also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 (stating that "[t]he door of the Free Exercise
Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs" and that the
government "may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief.., nor penalize or discriminate
against individuals or groups because they hold religious beliefs abhorrent to the authorities"
(citations omitted)).
267. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
268.

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(E) (2015).
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application to neutral laws. Eight RFRAs include facially neutral laws
within their scope. 26 9 Only three RFRAs provide that neutral laws cannot
of facially neutral
serve as the basis for a RFRA violation. 27 0 The status
27 1
RFRAs.
ten
remaining
the
in
undetermined
is
laws
Despite its minority status, the better approach is to expressly exclude
facially neutral laws from serving as the basis for a RFRA violation. Such
an approach is consistent with existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent
applying the compelling interest test only when reviewing laws targeting
specific religious practices. 27 2 To conclude otherwise creates a potential
means by which to challenge every law that incidentally impinges upon
religious practices and opens "the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind. 2 73 The impact of such an approach would "permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself,, 274 invite anarchy and contradicts
"constitutional tradition and common sense." 275 The government's ability
to execute public policy would be significantly impaired as laws
such policies could not survive compelling interest
implementing
276
scrutiny.
Assuming that there is a potential for such a "parade of horribles,"
facially neutral laws should be excluded from the reach of state
RFRAs. 2 77 However, the three RFRAs that exclude neutral laws take
different approaches. Missouri's RFRA excludes neutral rules that do not
discriminate against or among religions. 278 New Mexico's RFRA
modifies this approach by exempting only those neutral laws that do not
269. See supra notes 89, 132, 163 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 89, 132 and accompanying text.
271. Id.
272. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (stating that "a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling government interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice").
273. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 888-89 (1990)
(refusing to excuse individuals from compliance with "a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)" and listing compulsory military service, the payment of taxes, health
and safety regulations, compulsory vaccination requirements, drug laws, traffic laws, certain types
of social welfare legislation, child labor laws, prohibitions upon animal cruelty, environmental
protection laws, and laws prohibiting racial discrimination as requiring exemptions should the
Court apply the compelling interest test to all actions believed to be religiously commanded).
274. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
275. Id. at 885.

276. Id. at 888.
277. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing Justice Scalia's list of laws requiring
religious exemptions should the Court apply the compelling interest test to all religiously-inspired

actions).
278.

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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directly discriminate against or among religions. 279 Rhode Island's RFRA
if
utilizes yet another standard by removing neutral laws from its statute
280
they do not intentionally discriminate against or among religions.
The broader approach adopted by the Missouri RFRA is preferable in
this circumstance. The meaning of "direct discrimination" as utilized in
the New Mexico RFRA is unclear. The New Mexico RFRA and the
requirement of intentional discrimination in the Rhode Island RFRA fail
to recognize that neutral laws may at times impinge upon religious liberty
despite the absence of intent to discriminate. It is further improbable that
any neutral law would violate the Rhode Island RFRA given the unlikely
existence of an express intent to harm or establish a specific religion and
the plausibility of more benign legislative motives. By contrast, the
Missouri RFRA excludes neutral rules but also leaves open the possibility
that some types of such rules, albeit rare, may be capable of interfering
with religious practices absent "direct discrimination" or discriminatory
intent.2 8' This approach permits courts to strike "sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing state interests" rather than
speculate on the presence of direct discrimination or hunt for non-existent
discriminatory intent.2 8 2
The test to be applied to state and local laws alleged to interfere with
free exercise should be more clearly stated. Fourteen RFRAs provide that
a burden on the exercise of religion is justified only in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest. 2 83 In so providing, these RFRAs are
consistent with the federal RFRA and existing U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.2 84 However, seven RFRAs appear to set a higher standard by
not only requiring a compelling interest but also placing the evidentiary
burden upon the government to demonstrate that its actions are
279.
280.

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
Id.

281. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (contending that neutral laws of
general applicability were as capable of interfering with religious practices as laws expressly
targeting religion).
282.

Id. at 902.

283.

See supra notes 90, 133, 163 and accompanying text.

284.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(l) (2012) (providing that the government may

substantially burden a person's exercise of religion "only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest"); see also Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (holding that the religious practices of a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, who lost her job due to her refusal to work on Saturdays and was

consequently denied unemployment compensation, were unconstitutionally burdened due to the
absence of a compelling state interest in preventing the filing of fraudulent claims by persons
feigning religious objections and the effect of such claims upon the state unemployment fund and
employers); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-29, 234 (1972) (overturning a state
compulsory education statute as applied to Amish children due to the absence of a compelling
state interest in preparing students for participation in the political system and protecting them
from ignorance and exploitation by prospective employers).
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"essential" to furthering this interest.2 85 This additional requirement of
standard for burdens upon the exercise of
essentiality may set a higher
286
religion in these states.
The majority approach requiring proof of a compelling government
interest without the additional requirement of essentiality is preferable.
The description of "compelling government interests" in existing U.S.
Supreme Court precedent sets a high bar for government actions in the
context of religion. In Sherbert, the Court concluded that religiouslybased conduct deemed subject to permissible government regulation
"invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order." 287 Such instances implicated "the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests"
and were thus deserving of designation as
"compelling." 288 Similarly, in Yoder, the Court required a searching
examination of the interests the government sought to promote and
impediments to these objectives that would result from recognition of an
exemption for religious freedom. 28 9 "Compelling government interests"
were further described in Smith as those of "the highest order." 290 This
language is sufficiently stringent if the Court's words are to be taken at
their face value. 29 1 An additional requirement of "essentiality" heightens
an already challenging standard for governments to attain, adds an
additional, unnecessary layer of complication to such determinations, and
invites inadvisable judicial second-guessing as to the necessity of the
means selected by policymakers to address paramount public interests.292
The standard by which government action with respect to religious beliefs
and conduct is to be judged should be rigorous; it should not be
unattainable.
Related to the compelling interest standard is the burden of proof to
be met by the government in defending laws alleged to interfere with
religious liberty. Four RFRAs provide that the government must satisfy

285. See supra notes 91, 134 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
287. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
(polygamy and bigamy); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (mandatory smallpox vaccination program); and Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy).
288. Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
289. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
290. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
291. But see Eric D. Yordy, FixingFree Exercise: A Compelling Need to Relieve the Current
Burdens, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 191, 194 (2009) (criticizing the Court for its failure to
specifically define the term "compelling interest").
292. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (concluding that the government's ability to execute public
policy, including enforcement of prohibitions upon conduct perceived to be harmful to society,
could not depend on its effect on the spiritual development of religious objectors).
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its evidentiary burden through clear and convincing evidence. 293 The
Pennsylvania RFRA is the only one to utilize a preponderance of the
evidence standard.2 94 None of the remaining sixteen RFRAs or the federal
RFRA set forth the burden of proof to be met by the government in
establishing a compelling interest.
The approach requiring the government to produce clear and
convincing evidence with respect to justifications for the imposition of
burdens upon the exercise of religion is the preferable approach. The clear
and convincing evidentiary standard is consistent with the government's
heightened obligation to demonstrate not just an interest, but also a
compelling interest, underlying its actions. The clear and convincing
standard requires that the government demonstrate that the factual
contentions underlying its purported interest are "highly probable" rather
than simply more likely than not.295 This standard also permits courts to
balance the unique interests at stake, specifically, the religious belief or
practice at issue versus the government's purported public policy reasons
for the imposition of the challenged burden. 296 This balancing of interests
appropriately recognizes that the government should bear the brunt of the
risks associated with an erroneous decision. The harm associated with
interference with sincerely-held religious beliefs and actions is "typically
certain and immediate" whereas the consequences associated with
alleged government interests may be "speculative and remote." 297 This
disparity requires an enhanced standard of proof that permits courts to
accommodate competing interests. Utilization of this standard is also
consistent with other civil liberties cases implicating First Amendment
rights such as free speech.298 The free exercise of religion is no less
293. See supra notes 95, 138 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
295. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (defining the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard). The Tennessee Court of Appeals has defined the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard in the context of the Tennessee RFRA as requiring the elimination of "any
serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence"
and the production of "a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be
established." Johnson v. Levy, No. M2009-02596-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14, at
*21-22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010). See also Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 285
(3d Cir. 2009) (defining "clear and convincing evidence" in the context of the Pennsylvania RFRA
as "testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come
to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts at issue").
296. Johnson, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14, at *10.
297. Colorado, 467 U.S. at 316.
298. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (requiring
"convincing clarity" with respect to proof of falsity and actual malice as elements of a defamation
claim asserted by a public official). The Court subsequently described this standard as requiring
"clear and convincing evidence." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974). For
a discussion of the use of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in free speech cases, see
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is not Golden: ProtectingLawyer Speech Under the First
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worthy of protection through application of the clear and convincing
evidence standard than other civil liberties including the free exercise of
speech.
CONCLUSION

Clashes between the free exercise of religion and expanded
protections for the LGBT community are likely to continue in the
foreseeable future. Public accommodation laws are ill prepared to the
extent that they are a part of this conflict. This is due in part to the many
different forms they take throughout the country, including crucial
differences in terminology, definitions (or the absence thereof), coverage,
and prohibited practices. These differences have the potential to create
uncertainty and disparate treatment for members of the LGBT
community.
Some of the current difficulties and future conflicts may be minimized
by greater uniformity among state laws, but there are no perfect solutions.
Public accommodation statutes cannot be expected to "eliminate
disagreement or craft perfect solutions .... [but can only be expected to].
. set fair terms for the market., 299 Recognition of the right of everyone
to full and equal participation in the marketplace for goods and services
free from discrimination is such a fair term.
Policymakers must also recognize the proper role of religion and
exercise care so as not to interfere with what people do and say "in their
pews, homes and hearts." 300 However, any conflicts between religious
liberty asserted by secular businesses and access to goods and services
must be resolved in favor of the government's compelling interest in
guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory access for all persons. 30 1 Such
a result does not denigrate religion. Those opposed to homosexuality, in
the same manner as those opposed to same-sex marriage, are entitled to
"proper protection" guaranteed by the First Amendment. 3 2 Rather, such
a result only recognizes that, in the public sphere, the government's
interest in equal access outweighs those of enterprises seeking to
Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859,885-86 (1998).
299. Answer Brief of Appellee-Respondent Vanessa Wilock at 39, Elane Photography,
L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33,687).
300. Bruni, supranote 23 1.
301. See Eckholm, supra note 8, at Al (quoting James D. Esseks, the director of gay rights
issues at the American Civil Liberties Union, as stating that "[r]eligious liberty does not authorize
discrimination .... It's profoundly harmful to walk into a business open to the public and be told,
'No, we don't actually serve your kind here'.... That's not how America works").
302. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (emphasizing that "religions, and
those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction
that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned").
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discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs.
Religion can undoubtedly be freely exercised without engaging in
discriminatory practices in the commercial marketplace. To hold
otherwise is to invite arbitrary, unpredictable, and discriminatory results
and undermine the ongoing commitment to furthering the causes of
fundamental fairness and equal protection under the law. Equal and nondiscriminatory access to public accommodations and the free exercise of
religion are more than just political and religious differences. They are
human rights to which all are entitled to partake and enjoy. Policymakers
would be wise to recognize that the intersection of sexual orientation,
religious freedom and public accommodation laws do not present
political or religious issues but
more importantly concern "how we treat
30 3
each other as human beings."

303. Tim Cook, Pro-discrimination 'religiousfreedom' laws are dangerous, WASH. POST
(Mar. 29, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pro-discrimination-religiousfreedom-laws-are-dangerous.
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